Whenever the region appears to be moving closer to de-escalation, Israel intervenes to reignite the flames. Only hours after US President Donald Trump disclosed a framework document aimed at reaching an agreement to end the war with Iran, Israel carried out a dual military operation: one in Beirut’s southern suburb targeting a commander of Hezbollah’s Radwan Force, and another in Gaza targeting the family of Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya.
It is difficult to regard these developments as mere coincidence. For Benjamin Netanyahu, war has become the ultimate political survival card. Anything short of perpetual crisis could expose him to the full force of ongoing corruption and bribery investigations that threaten his political future.
The domestic Israeli scene increasingly resembles a surrealist canvas, where the ambitions of politicians and parties collide with a deeply divided society exhausted by war on multiple fronts.
As the next elections—scheduled for October, or perhaps even earlier—draw closer, political tensions have sharply intensified. This followed the Israeli Supreme Court’s refusal to examine petitions filed by families of those killed, demanding the formation of an official state commission to investigate the October events and the subsequent war, a move Netanyahu had sought to avoid.
The dilemma lies in the absence of judicial consensus over whether the government is legally obligated to establish such a commission. Historically, the outcomes of these investigations have often led to sweeping political and military dismissals, as happened after the Agranat Commission following Israel’s defeat in the October War of 1973, and the Kahan Commission, which investigated the Sabra and Shatila massacres in Beirut in September 1982.
Experience has repeatedly shown that Netanyahu performs at his political best during periods of crisis. His name has become closely associated with a doctrine of “political survival through managed conflict,” a strategy designed to transform existential security threats into electoral leverage and a mechanism for postponing political and judicial accountability.
He frequently invokes the notion of “absolute victory” as a mobilizing slogan, linking his political future to the achievement of a vaguely defined military objective with no clear timeline. This effectively grants him an open-ended mandate to remain in power. High-profile military operations—such as strikes targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—are likewise perceived as instruments for boosting Likud’s popularity. Netanyahu also takes pride in his close relationship with successive US administrations, particularly Donald Trump’s current administration, portraying himself as uniquely capable of securing unconditional international backing for Israel’s military campaigns.
Through wars and national emergencies, Netanyahu has also managed to place the opposition in what many describe as a “patriotism trap.” Political rivals such as Benny Gantz or Yair Lapid find it difficult to criticize him aggressively while Israeli soldiers remain on the battlefield. This dynamic weakens the opposition and grants Netanyahu additional legitimacy.
At the same time, the Supreme Court’s position has provided him with broader room for maneuver ahead of the upcoming elections. Backed by opinion polls suggesting he still commands considerable public influence, Netanyahu’s supporters continue to frame his policies as unavoidable security necessities.
What further strengthens his position is the growing fragmentation among parties attempting to build a united front against him. According to the Israeli newspaper Maariv, Netanyahu has raised the stakes politically and electorally, even declaring his willingness to form a future coalition government with the support of Arab parties. However, he demanded the right to personally select ten candidates for the Likud electoral list, warning that he could take the dramatic step of running outside the party altogether.
This threat evokes memories of Ariel Sharon’s creation of the Kadima Party in November 2005—a move widely described at the time as political suicide. Sharon resigned from Likud, a party he had helped establish, following fierce internal disputes with the party’s hardline right wing, then led by Netanyahu, over the Gaza disengagement plan. Yet Kadima ultimately succeeded in forming the government, despite Sharon remaining in intensive care until his death was officially announced years later.
Only a week ago, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid established the “Together” alliance, seeking to lead a coalition aimed at defeating Netanyahu in the next elections. Remarkably, despite being only days old, the new bloc topped recent opinion polls conducted by Lazar Research in cooperation with Panel4All, securing more than 46% support compared to Likud’s 42%. Yet such numbers are not always decisive in Israel’s volatile political environment, where voters have become increasingly detached from traditional party loyalties.
Despite Netanyahu’s carefully crafted strategies, current realities point to unprecedented challenges confronting his political model. Thus far, he has failed to achieve a decisive outcome in Gaza, Lebanon, or Iran. Even his most reliable political asset—the military establishment—no longer guarantees overwhelming superiority. Emerging alliances such as the Bennett-Lapid coalition present a formidable alternative narrative centered on Netanyahu’s failure to translate military operations into long-term strategic gains.
As the war approaches its third year, it has exposed profound fractures within Israeli society itself. Extensive research data indicate a growing decline in public trust and social cohesion across various sectors. A recent study conducted by researchers from Tel-Hai University and Tel Aviv University paints a deeply complex picture of Israel after two and a half years of conflict. According to the study, 43% of respondents expressed greater fear of internal political divisions and domestic threats, compared to 38% who feared external security threats such as missiles and drones launched by Hezbollah or Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Moreover, violence within Israeli society itself was viewed by many as an even greater danger than external military threats.
In essence, this is the environment Netanyahu perceives not as a crisis, but as an opportunity: an opportunity to preserve power and potentially secure another term in office—not out of concern for Israel’s security, but out of fear that judicial consequences could ultimately end his career not as a victorious statesman, but as a convicted politician.
Throughout his political career, Netanyahu has repeatedly transformed national security crises into instruments for personal political survival. Yet today, this strategy faces its most difficult test before an Israeli society exhausted by an endless war with no clear political horizon. The central question remains: how long can this model endure amid the steady erosion of internal trust?
Prof. Hatem Sadek, Helwan University
