New Delhi – In an increasingly interconnected world, India’s strategic engagement with the African continent continues to evolve, forming a key pillar of its foreign policy. Against this backdrop, Dr. Samir Bhattacharya, Associate Fellow for Africa at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in New Delhi, shares insights into the multifaceted India-Egypt relationship, highlighting recent developments and future prospects. Also present was Mr. Gautam Chikermane, Vice President at ORF, who offered broader reflections on Indian-African relations.
How does India view its relationship with Egypt, and what are the most significant recent developments and areas of cooperation between Cairo and New Delhi?
Egypt is an extremely important country for India. This is reflected in the high-level diplomatic exchanges between our two nations. For instance, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi was honoured as Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations in 2023—a gesture India reserves for its closest partners.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also visited Egypt several times, including a significant visit last year. These high-level engagements underscore the weight India places on its ties with Cairo.
We see Egypt as a strategic partner at the confluence of the Arab world, Europe, and Africa. Our collaborations span both conventional and emerging sectors. Beyond longstanding cooperation, we are now exploring joint ventures in green hydrogen and defence manufacturing. While these initiatives are still at an early stage, they reflect a growing mutual interest in building capabilities together.
India, in line with its “Atmanirbhar Bharat” or self-reliance initiative, is looking to strengthen its defence manufacturing sector. Egypt is a natural partner in this pursuit. We’re looking at co-producing equipment such as drones and technologies useful in counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism efforts—areas where Egypt also plays a critical regional role.
Culturally, ties are vibrant. Egypt currently receives the highest number of Indian tourists in Africa, followed by South Africa. To promote such exchanges, we also host a monthly event called Diplomat’s Diary, where ambassadors share their vision on cooperation. The Egyptian Ambassador is scheduled to join us next month to explore further opportunities in tourism.
Taken together, these dimensions show the depth and promise of the India-Egypt relationship. While there’s still untapped potential—particularly in security cooperation—the foundations are strong, and I’m confident the relationship will grow even stronger moving forward.
Turning to India’s broader engagement with Africa, the relationship is often described as ‘long and deep.’ How would you describe its evolution, particularly with developments such as the African Union’s inclusion in the G20?
India’s ties with Africa stretch back decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, India contributed to building railroads and infrastructure across the continent. These were not mere economic transactions but part of a deeper South-South solidarity.
Fast forward to the present, the African Union’s inclusion in the G20 under India’s G20 Presidency is a landmark development. It illustrates both the maturity of our ties and India’s commitment to ensuring African voices are heard on global platforms.
Under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership, Africa has become a key foreign policy priority. India has launched several development-focused initiatives, covering areas such as infrastructure, digital transformation, and healthcare. Our approach is not solely commercial. We see ourselves as development partners, working alongside African nations to address critical challenges like food security and sustainable technologies.
In recent years, the Indian Navy has increased its presence along Africa’s coastline. How is this related to maritime competition—particularly with China? Is India looking to expand its influence in a region where China already has significant presence?
There is no direct competition with China. India’s maritime engagement is rooted in its own strategic and economic interests, especially regarding trade and maritime security. This is not a new development—it builds on a long history of maritime connections with Africa, predating colonial times.
Indian traders have long sailed across the Indian Ocean in small boats, establishing communities that still thrive today. The large Indian diaspora across the continent is living proof of this enduring connection. Many members of these communities are contributing meaningfully to their host nations’ development.
India was also a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement alongside Egypt and many African countries. Our engagement is therefore anchored in history, mutual respect, and solidarity.
Since around 2010, India has stepped up its naval operations in the Indian Ocean, especially in response to piracy off Somalia. Our naval patrols serve both national and global interests by securing key trade routes. For instance, India was the first international responder to the cyclone that struck Mozambique in 2019—highlighting our commitment to regional security.
We also support local capacity-building. In Mauritius, for example, we helped construct an airstrip on Agaléga Island that can be used for security and civilian purposes. Moreover, India engages in trilateral initiatives like the IBSA grouping (India, Brazil, South Africa), which conducts the IBSAMAR naval exercises to bolster Africa’s maritime capabilities.
In short, India’s initiatives in Africa are independent and driven by a long-term vision—not a reaction to what others are doing.
Both India and China are major economies. Many expected them to jointly champion an alternative global payment system. But progress has been slow. Is India hesitant, perhaps wary of the West—or of China?
That’s a critical question. The fundamental issue is whether it is in India’s interest to help replace a Western-led global order with a China-led one. Given our history of border tensions and strategic rivalry with China, I don’t believe that would serve India’s interests—or anyone else’s.
That said, the need for an alternative payment system is very real. The way Russia was unilaterally cut off from SWIFT during the Ukraine crisis exposed vulnerabilities in the current system. There is a strong case for building parallel financial infrastructure.
But building such a system requires massive resources, trust, and long-term cooperation among countries. It cannot be rushed. Importantly, we are not seeking to replace one dominant power with another. The aim is to create space for countries like India—and for others in Africa, South America, and Asia—to shape their own economic futures.
Is there scope for a truly independent third alternative—one that is neither US-led nor China-led?
Yes, there is. With today’s technology, innovation ecosystems, and increasing South-South cooperation, the emergence of a third path is certainly possible. However, this is not something that will happen overnight. It demands significant investment in financial infrastructure, digital tools, and international consensus.
But the potential is there. And in time, we may well see the rise of a genuinely multipolar financial order—one that reflects the interests and values of a broader set of global stakeholders.
