The deadlock in the Islamabad negotiations threatens to drag the US-Israeli war on Iran into a tunnel of mutual attrition, after it has already moved beyond the phase of “swift strikes.” With every passing hour, the prospects for reaching an acceptable resolution to this impasse continue to narrow, as the instruments of warfare approach the limits of their decisive capacity, particularly amid the conflicting objectives of the parties involved.
When time becomes a pressing constraint, the locus of crisis shifts from the battlefield to decision-making circles. Strategic decision-making thus turns into a stark trade-off between what is “prohibited”—due to its intolerable cost—and what is “critical,” given its diminishing chances of success. Consequently, decision-makers are often compelled to opt for the latter, as they simply cannot afford the price of the former.
In Iran, the dust of sustained strikes has unsettled the very structure of governance. Leadership figures have either disappeared or been eliminated through targeted assassinations, making it increasingly difficult to identify a clear “address” for negotiation: is it the Revolutionary Guard, shadow religious authorities, or nominal civilian fronts? More importantly, what are the limits of their mandate, and from where is it derived? Despite mediation efforts led by regional actors such as Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, all tracks have reached a dead end, with neither the underlying causes nor the points of contention clearly understood.
This stalemate has pushed the conflict from the corridors of power into the streets as the ultimate arena of resolution. Hardliners in Iran have targeted former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and former President Hassan Rouhani, branding them “traitors” following their call to end the war through a published proposal for de-escalation. They argued that Tehran should “leverage its advantage not to prolong the fight, but to declare victory and reach an agreement.”
Zarif, a seasoned statesman, proposed a de-escalation framework centered on “declaring victory and securing a deal,” warning that continued conflict would only result in further destruction of infrastructure and mounting civilian casualties. He even suggested that Iran scale back its nuclear program and reopen the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the lifting of all sanctions, alongside a call to restore diplomatic relations with the United States. Rouhani, for his part, emphasized the necessity of safeguarding national resources and avoiding attacks on Gulf islands in order to preserve national interests.
In reality, neither man is engaging in capitulation or betrayal, as their opponents claim. Rather, they are applying the essence of strategic trade-offs, seeking to swallow the bitter pill of what is “critical,” even if it entails temporary setback or embarrassment, in order to avoid falling into what is “prohibited,” which would mean the collapse of the state itself.
On the other side, the US-Israeli landscape appears no less complex. If Iran suffers from a “fluidity of authority,” its adversaries are plagued by “inflated and conflicting objectives.” From Israel’s perspective, the immediate goal is to neutralize the regime at its core—its nuclear capabilities, missile systems, and proxy networks—while ensuring its inability to regenerate. As long as Israeli and American strikes continue targeting the regime’s economic centers, it is anticipated that public unrest will eventually erupt, serving as the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s back—likely backed by substantial armed forces.
This aligns with the aspirations of the nationalist right for an “absolute victory” and a reshaping of the Middle East through hard power, viewing any negotiation at this stage as a “critical” option that would squander military superiority. For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, returning to the negotiating table without achieving an “existential victory” would amount to personal political suicide. Hence, he edges toward the brink of what is “prohibited”—a full-scale regional war—betting that the primary cost will ultimately be borne by the American ally.
In Washington, however, calculations are steeped in contradiction. The administration recognizes that slipping into an open confrontation with Iran represents the ultimate “prohibited” scenario—one that could devastate its electoral prospects and jeopardize vital interests. Republicans, led by Donald Trump, aim to maintain their slim majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, President Trump may soon be compelled to seek congressional authorization to sustain or expand the war—both scenarios effectively transferring the conflict to the American domestic arena, a burden that may prove politically unsustainable.
It is also worth noting that the administration has proposed a 10% reduction in non-defense discretionary spending, while allocating $1.5trn of the federal budget to defense for fiscal year 2027, amid growing concerns over the depletion of strategic munitions stockpiles due to the ongoing conflict. This financial and military strain may ultimately force the “critical” option upon an administration that lacks the political resolve to impose it on its Israeli ally.
The US-Israeli dilemma lies in the fact that the “ceiling of force” has been reached. Airstrikes and assassinations have weakened the adversary but failed to break its will. Decision-makers in Washington and Tel Aviv now face the same equation confronting Iran: do they possess the capacity to bear the cost of the “prohibited” should the entire region ignite? Or will they accept the bitterness of the “critical” and return to negotiations before attrition erodes what remains of their deterrent power?
Regrettably, all three parties to the conflict are playing with fire in an already volatile region—one that holds vast oil resources underpinning the global economy, and which cannot withstand descent into protracted conflicts akin to those experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan. These precedents demonstrated failure for one fundamental reason: the moment of decisive, painful decision-making was missed, allowing escalation into far more devastating outcomes.
What is “prohibited” for the region is a slide into total war or widespread regional collapse—an “unbearable” cost that threatens not only regimes but also global energy security and established spheres of influence. It is, in essence, a suicidal option whose consequences are well understood, keeping it firmly within the realm of the “prohibited.” This reality imposes a form of enforced rationality on decision-makers—whether in regional capitals or in Washington and Beijing—where oil ceases to be merely a tool for financing war and instead becomes a constraint against its escalation, given that the cost of supply disruption far outweighs any conceivable political or military gains.
None of the parties—Tehran or its adversaries—retain the financial, political, or military “luxury” of absorbing the consequences of the “prohibited.” Continuing the war without resolution would only deplete the very resources that sustain their relevance. Thus, choosing the “critical” path—negotiation—emerges as a rational act of survival.
Ultimately, geopolitics teaches us that prolonged attrition only erodes available margins. Today, decision-makers confront a stark reality: sovereign choice in this crisis is a trade-off between what is “prohibited” due to its intolerable cost and what is “critical” due to its uncertain success. Returning to negotiations, therefore, is not an act of weakness, but a necessary alignment with the latter option because none can afford the price of the former.
Prof. Hatem Sadek – Helwan University
