LAHORE: July was one of the roughest months in Pakistan’s history. The country’s establishment was blamed for duplicity in the American war effort in Afghanistan, backing both sides — the United States and the Taliban — at the same time. There was considerable public anger in Pakistan at the way British Prime Minister David Cameron handled such suspicions, some of which was directed at President Asif Ali Zardari, who decided to proceed with a planned official visit to London despite Cameron’s harsh language.
Public anger at the charges coming from America and Britain about Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) increased as round-the-clock television coverage showed the devastation and suffering caused by floods in the country’s northwest, the worst in more than 80 years. The military launched a major effort to help those affected. Its commander, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, whose tenure in office was recently, and unusually, extended for an additional three years, was alone among Pakistan’s senior leaders in visiting the flood-affected areas and showing concern about the suffering. And this was not the only crisis in which the military leadership seemed to be doing what the public thought was right.
The Wikileaks publication of raw US intelligence reports from Afghanistan confirmed what had long been suspected. A number of field reports described contacts between the ISI and the Taliban, even as the ISI was engaged in fighting some the Taliban in Pakistan. The records contained firsthand accounts of the anger felt by Americans at the ISI’s unwillingness to confront the insurgents, in particular those who were attacking US and NATO troops near the Pakistani border. The ISI seemed to be keeping its lines of communications open to some Taliban in the hope that they could be used as a reserve force in case of another military confrontation with India or a precipitous American withdrawal from Afghanistan.
This theme of apparent Pakistani duplicity was picked up by Cameron. In a speech delivered before an audience of Indian business leaders in Bangalore, he accused Pakistan of being on both sides of the Afghan equation.
Cameron’s remarks were deeply resented in Pakistan. They left the impression that Britain was prepared to humiliate Pakistan publicly in order to curry favor with the Indians. The strategy may work over the short term in winning export orders for British firms from India. Indeed, the prime minister’s team won at least one major contract — for the sale of military aircraft worth more than a billion dollars. But, over the long run, British behavior is likely to contribute to the worsening of Indian-Pakistani relations.
The Pakistani public demanded a quick, decisive rebuke of Britain from the country’s leadership. It came from the military. Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, the head of the ISI, canceled his planned visit to London, where he was to discuss intelligence matters, while the civilian leadership seemed to dither. After hesitating, Zardari arrived in London three days later.
Pakistan’s civilian government also seemed to be dropping the ball in the economic field, as poor management by the authorities was driving the country towards another crisis. Partly because of the floods, which will shave off at least 1% from GDP, partly because of the administration’s inability and unwillingness to curb non-essential expenditures, and partly because of slowing export growth, Pakistan is once again facing serious fiscal and balance-of-payments problems.
This time, however, foreign help might not be as readily available as it was in, say, 2008. The government anticipated 4.1% GDP growth in 2010-2011. It will be lucky if it manages to achieve 2.8%, one half of that expected in Bangladesh and one-third of that projected for India.
Pakistan is now the sick man of South Asia, with three consecutive years of growth below 3% causing the number of people living in absolute poverty to increase by 10 million. Much of this increase is occurring in large cities where discontent was already mounting in response to the government’s palpable failure to provide basic goods and services.
These deepening crises on several fronts — some attributed to poor governance — raise the question once again as to whether Pakistan can sustain its democracy. The military’s high and positive profile seems to suggest that it is the only institution left in a tottering state that seems able to stabilize a delicate situation.
But will Pakistan’s military once more inject itself directly into the political arena, as it has done four times in the six decades since independence? Or will the country’s civilian leaders mend their ways?
The difference between today and the periods that preceded other Pakistani coups is that an active civil society, an unconstrained electronic and print media, and an assertive judiciary may be able to keep the military in the barracks and force the politicians onto the right track. Nevertheless, July was a cruel month for Pakistan, and more seem certain to follow.
Shahid Javed Burki, a former Finance Minister of Pakistan and Vice President of the World Bank, is currently Chairman of the Institute of Public Policy, Lahore. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.org).
