Iran’s strategy of negotiated pressure–whether driven by intransigence or internal factional rivalry–effectively grants US President Donald Trump a form of political cover to return to the battlefield. Beyond that, it risks drawing in other actors–such as the European Union and NATO–that have thus far remained on the sidelines but may be compelled to engage under mounting energy pressures and rising oil prices. Should that occur, the emerging alliance map could upend the geopolitical landscape entirely.
This approach was evident in the lead-up to the second Islamabad negotiations, when Tehran conditioned its participation on lifting the naval blockade. The move embarrassed Washington and forced mediators to intervene, ultimately resulting in an extension of the truce and granting Iran additional time.
The extension has shifted the Washington-Tehran confrontation into a more intricate phase of calibrated balances and intersecting objectives–one unlikely to yield decisive gains for either side. Both are now racing against time while simultaneously seeking, to varying degrees, to avoid the trap of direct military confrontation.
If the Iranian regime has little left to lose, the so-called “Forty-Day War,” despite its high cost, has temporarily restructured the domestic front by rallying public support around the leadership in a moment of existential threat. Yet this cohesion appears contingent and may dissipate once hostilities subside. Under such conditions, the regime may come to view war itself as a strategic option–particularly if it sustains internal stability.
To clarify the stakes: even if negotiations produce an agreement on the three core files–nuclear, ballistic, and regional proxies–without the unfreezing of assets, lifting of sanctions, or support for reconstruction, the regime would still face renewed domestic backlash. This would be compounded by severe economic repercussions, damaged infrastructure, and deepening divisions among civilian, military, and clerical factions within the ruling establishment.
Herein lies Tehran’s equation: what is required is not merely a political or military agreement, but an economic payoff–one that directly improves the lives of Iranian citizens and provides the regime with a lifeline.
Time itself has thus become an additional arena of conflict. Iran leverages it to maximize its negotiating gains, while Washington seeks to compress it to achieve a political breakthrough. Between these trajectories, Tehran employs a strategy of “negotiated pressure,” manoeuvring through successive rounds of dialogue in pursuit of an agreement that appears political on the surface but delivers immediate economic dividends beneath.
In practice, the regime faces a growing challenge in maintaining internal cohesion. According to an exclusive report by Iran International, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf launched a sharp attack on opponents of a potential agreement with Washington, warning of grave consequences for the future of the Islamic Republic.
These developments have exposed a rift between the political leadership and the military establishment. Just one day after Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi signalled readiness to reopen dialogue and pursue a political settlement, forces affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targeted commercial vessels and called for a resumption of hostilities, arguing that Washington is not negotiating in good faith.
So far, Tehran’s power centres appear to regard military defeat as potentially manageable–whereas regime collapse remains entirely off the table. Accordingly, they continue to exert pressure on Donald Trump, fully aware that portions of his negotiating leverage are eroding over time.
Economically, rising oil prices have fuelled inflation–an issue flagged in reports by international financial institutions–and this, in turn, undermines the president’s domestic standing. Politically, Trump faces mounting pressure ahead of the midterm congressional elections in November, alongside declining approval ratings and growing international and Arab opposition to a return to war.
Even his remaining military options carry risks that may outweigh their potential gains. Before any escalation, Trump would need a compelling justification to re-enter combat; otherwise, such a move could be perceived as an erosion of US credibility–particularly given that most high-value military targets have already been neutralized. This was underscored by Vice President JD Vance, who stated that “the military objectives have been achieved.”
Targeting civilian, economic, or oil infrastructure would undoubtedly intensify pressure on the already strained Iranian public–but it would also carry significant ethical costs and constitute a violation of international law. Even if such considerations are not decisive for Trump, they remain potent instruments in the hands of international organizations. A strike on oil facilities, in particular, would represent a scenario with highly unpredictable and potentially severe consequences.
Trump himself appears acutely aware of the time constraint and the dangers of falling into a protracted conflict–despite publicly denying any such pressure on his platform, Truth Social. He insists that he is “under no pressure” to reach an agreement with Tehran, that “time is not against him,” and that any eventual deal will be “far superior” to the nuclear agreement concluded under Barack Obama in 2015.
In reality, however, European allies have largely left him to confront the conflict alone, while Gulf partners remain dissatisfied–arguing that he has neither decisively ended the war by toppling the regime nor adequately involved them in political negotiations to address their concerns and future vision. Most critically, he has effectively handed Tehran a highly sensitive bargaining chip: the Strait of Hormuz, which could evolve into a sustained pressure point on Gulf oil exports.
Ultimately, Iran appears inclined to prolong a state of “neither war nor peace,” treating it as a strategic space for manoeuver and attrition. This is particularly true in light of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz–through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies pass–granting Tehran the ability to raise the cost of escalation without triggering full-scale war.
Prof. Hatem Sadek – Helwan University
