Optimism has grown following the latest round of US-mediated talks between Lebanon and Israel and the announcement of a new ceasefire agreement. The accord stipulates that no state or non-state actor should be allowed to hold Lebanon hostage; an implicit reference to Tehran and Hezbollah, though neither is mentioned explicitly.
In theory, the four rounds of negotiations and the new agreement are intended to pave the way for a comprehensive security and peace arrangement, providing Lebanon with the support necessary to end Iranian interference in its domestic affairs. One of the agreement’s most notable provisions is the creation of pilot security zones designed to establish areas free from Hezbollah’s presence. Yet there is little reason to believe the deal will end Hezbollah’s military operations or compel the group to withdraw north of the Litani River.
Such an outcome was supposed to have been achieved decades ago, beginning with the efforts of the 1980s, through the Taif Agreement, and later with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war. Nevertheless, Hezbollah remained exempt from meaningful disarmament.
This agreement is also unlikely to achieve its stated objectives. Iran continues to view Hezbollah as a critical bargaining chip in its ongoing negotiations with Washington and is unlikely to relinquish that leverage except within the framework of a broader strategic settlement—one that guarantees regime security, removes the threat of military confrontation, and preserves Tehran’s influence over the Strait of Hormuz, even if only in an administrative capacity during an initial phase.
Even under the most optimistic scenario, successful implementation of the agreement could inadvertently provide Hezbollah with a strategic advantage. Relocating its forces north of the Litani River may effectively extend its influence across much of Lebanon, strengthening its grip on state institutions, facilitating the redeployment of its arsenal, and increasing the likelihood of civil confrontations. Reports have already emerged of clashes between residents of southern villages and Hezbollah members.
Furthermore, a Lebanese state still struggling to recover from severe economic deterioration and institutional weakness may unintentionally offer Hezbollah and its Iranian-backed social networks an opportunity to assume functions traditionally performed by the state. Such a development could replicate the southern Lebanon model in the country’s northern regions, thereby expanding the party’s sphere of influence and securing the loyalty of additional communities.
In reality, Hezbollah has little interest in openly dominating Lebanon’s official political landscape. The group understands that overt control would place it directly in Israel’s crosshairs. At present, Israel conducts targeted and selective operations against Hezbollah as an armed non-state actor. Were Hezbollah to assume visible political control, however, a full-scale military confrontation with Lebanon could become only a matter of time. The current arrangement allows the organization to maneuver politically and militarily while operating under the protective umbrella of the Lebanese state and population, both of which have effectively become hostages to its influence.
From the Israeli perspective, the direct negotiations taking place in Washington appear constructive, but they will require the United States to deploy its full diplomatic weight and exert substantial economic pressure to marginalize Iran and Hezbollah. Alternatively, this could mean the continuation of the conflict that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arguably views as essential to his political survival ahead of future elections. Many Israeli military leaders also contend that none of the fronts that erupted following October 7, 2023, have been decisively resolved. This strategic impasse remains a central theme exploited by Israel’s opposition.
Supporters of a more assertive approach argue that if President Donald Trump seeks a transformative success capable of reshaping the Middle East, he will need to undertake a profound reassessment of his strategy and pursue a far more coherent, consistent, and determined foreign policy.
Trump himself faces growing challenges on the Iranian file. Having entered what many perceive as a cycle of diplomatic leverage and counter-leverage, he is searching for an alternative victory that can be achieved within an increasingly narrow political timetable. With major international events and domestic political milestones approaching—including World Cup festivities, Independence Day celebrations, and the congressional midterm elections—he has a strong incentive to secure a rapid agreement.
Having launched his campaign against Iran with rhetoric emphasizing decisive action, Trump now finds himself navigating a complex strategic landscape partly of his own making. His efforts to construct a narrative centered on a broad regional agreement have become increasingly difficult to sustain. Consequently, every Israeli action in Lebanon is measured against a single question: does it advance or obstruct the path toward an agreement? Trump seeks a deal, but he cannot afford one that appears weak or resembles a rebranded version of the Obama-era nuclear accord.
Meanwhile, Iran remains committed to a strategy of patience. By prolonging negotiations and maximizing leverage at the bargaining table, Tehran seeks to extract the greatest possible concessions. Iranian policymakers understand that the longer talks continue, the harder it becomes for the American president to claim that military achievements have translated into a clear and measurable diplomatic success.
Implementation mechanisms will remain the primary obstacle to any lasting agreement between Israel and Lebanon. The Lebanese state lacks both the institutional tools and the resources necessary to enforce such an arrangement. The Lebanese Armed Forces remain relatively limited in size and capacity, and a financial package of $230 million is insufficient to establish sovereign control over a militia that has spent three decades building deeply entrenched infrastructure supported by Iranian resources. Even if the Lebanese military were to receive comprehensive assistance, implementation would likely falter without a parallel understanding with Tehran, particularly given the risk of triggering internal conflict.
As the conflict approaches its third month, signs of exhaustion are becoming increasingly visible. Iran faces the cumulative effects of war, sanctions, and growing domestic pressures. Relations between Trump and Netanyahu have reportedly deteriorated to the point of personal recriminations and accusations of ingratitude. At the same time, reports indicate logistical strains within the US military, while Israel’s armed forces continue to bear the burden of operations across multiple fronts that have remained active since October 2023. Internal divisions within Israel’s military establishment have also become increasingly apparent in the Hebrew-language press.
A review of the history of American mediation in the Middle East reveals a recurring pattern: despite possessing unparalleled leverage and resources, Washington often struggles to achieve lasting success at the final stage of negotiations. The current talks represent an opportunity, but no more than that. Opportunities are often fleeting.
Ultimately, any sustainable breakthrough will require the Israeli government to place long-term strategic interests above partisan calculations and electoral considerations. Ending the cycle of bloodshed and destruction in Lebanon should not be viewed as a concession to Iran but rather as a means of depriving Tehran of one of its most valuable negotiating assets. Only then can the various tracks of the regional conflict be separated, at least temporarily. That, however, is the price Tel Aviv would have to be willing to pay.
Prof. Hatem Sadek, Helwan University
