Israel harbours deeper concerns over US President Donald Trump’s potential nuclear deal with Iran than it ever did regarding the agreement negotiated under Barack Obama. According to Tel Aviv, the imminent accord would leave Iran merely months away from acquiring a nuclear weapon while severely limiting Israel’s ability to deliver a decisive military strike against Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure. In this scenario, Iran would preserve its controversial program, and Israel would lose what it perceives as a historic opportunity to dismantle Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.
Over a month ago, Trump unexpectedly announced the beginning of direct negotiations with Tehran, aiming to curtail Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the easing of economic sanctions. His declaration came in the presence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who had traveled to Washington seeking American approval for pre-emptive strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Over the past two years, Israel has weakened Iran’s regional influence through sustained military operations against its allies—Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon—and by the removal of its key ally, former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. At the same time, severe Western sanctions have crippled Iran’s oil-dependent economy.
Upon finalizing the deal, Trump is expected to assert that he has extracted greater concessions from Iran than his predecessors, Obama and Joe Biden. His claim would hinge on two major factors: the inclusion of US nuclear inspectors alongside IAEA monitors in Iran’s nuclear sites and a complete halt to uranium enrichment—even at low levels—for a symbolic period that may last a year. However, Israeli officials remain deeply concerned, viewing this agreement as even riskier than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015, which they largely dismissed as flawed.
President Biden’s most significant diplomatic achievement was persuading Tehran to freeze its 60% uranium enrichment—a feat achieved in 2023 through a US agreement releasing $6 billion of Iran’s frozen assets. Obama, on the other hand, succeeded in reducing Iran’s medium-enriched uranium stockpile to 3.67% but failed to halt enrichment entirely or secure Tehran’s consent for American inspectors to participate in monitoring.
There are several additional concessions Trump may secure that neither Biden nor Obama could—such as guarantees against attacks on US forces or a temporary moratorium on Iran’s ballistic missile tests, which have both conventional and nuclear applications. If accomplished, why does this alarm Israeli officials?
Israeli intelligence leaders, including the Mossad Director and the head of military intelligence, have spent substantial diplomatic capital lobbying the Trump administration and its envoy, Steve Witkoff, in numerous meetings across the Middle East, Europe, and the US Their objective was to push negotiations toward two extreme outcomes: Tehran’s submission or a decisive military strike. However, these efforts clashed with Trump’s transactional style, which prioritizes immediate gains over long-term strategy. While Israeli officials believe they made some progress, fears persist that Trump’s main goal is securing a deal—regardless of whether it aligns with Israel’s stringent security concerns.
Additionally, if Trump pressures Israel to abandon military action, it might not only prevent overt strikes but also hinder covert operations, such as Mossad-led sabotage missions that have delayed Iran’s nuclear weapons program in recent years.
In 2015, Iran relied on about 20,000 aging IR-1 centrifuges, requiring roughly a year to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb. By 2025, however, Iran possesses thousands of advanced IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges, a fraction of which could be concealed in undisclosed facilities much smaller than the known sites at Natanz and Fordow. This would allow Tehran to achieve weapons-grade uranium within months. Reports indicate Iran’s current enrichment levels reach 60%—a threshold demonstrating mastery of nuclear science, making bomb acquisition more a matter of timing than technical capability.
From Israel’s perspective, any agreement at this stage would consolidate Iran’s nuclear potential while lifting international sanctions, enabling Tehran to accelerate its program. By contrast, Israeli leadership sees the current moment as an unparalleled strategic opportunity: with Hamas and Hezbollah weakened, no time is more suitable for a pre-emptive strike.
In conclusion, whatever restrictions and safeguards Trump’s team negotiates, at best they would leave Iran just months from a nuclear breakout while denying Israel its clearest chance in decades to strike. Tehran may be open to a deal but remains wary of Trump’s unpredictable leadership and sceptical of any non-binding agreement that a future US administration might discard. The most it would likely accept is a temporary enrichment suspension in exchange for the release of frozen funds and recognition of its right to civilian nuclear energy—an outcome Israel would see as disastrous.
Meanwhile, Gulf states and regional actors, while wary of Iran’s ambitions, increasingly prefer uneasy coexistence over a catastrophic war that could disrupt economies and stall development plans. The negotiation landscape remains murky and fraught with uncertainty for all involved.
Dr. Hatem Sadek – Professor at Helwan University
