A disgrace upon the Brotherhood
Al Masry Al Yawm
Qandil vehemently criticises the ruling institution’s move to dismiss the attorney general. He writes that while he believes in the necessity of removing Attorney General Abdel Meguid Mahmoud from his post, the clumsy manner in which President Mohamed Morsy and the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood went about the task resulted in disaster.
Qandil claims that he has information confirming that Mahmoud had indeed privately accepted his new appointment as ambassador to the Vatican before it was announced. In his haste to announce the decision and distract the public from the ‘Battle of the Camel’ court ruling, the president declared the move to the public before officially confirming and implementing it. The attorney general subsequently decided to remain in his post, challenging the political leadership.
The writer believes that Mahmoud’s supposed u-turn may in fact have been caused by inflammatory remarks made by Muslim Brotherhood leaders which may have been perceived by him as threats. He deplores the Brotherhood for making a hero out of a man who was considered an enemy of the revolution and the people.
Qandil views the proposed solution to change the law to be able to oust Mahmoud as shameful and dangerous. He instead suggests that a ‘general prosecutor for the revolution’ be appointed especially by the president, dedicated entirely to addressing cases related to the revolution and its events, in order to sidestep the current dilemma and avoid further complications.
Five men and one phone call for the president
Emad El-Din Adeeb
In clear allusion to perceived problems and mistakes made by the president due to ill-conceived suggestions from his advisers, Adeeb advises the president to meet five men whose counsel the writer believes he needs, and to make one important phone call.
The first of the men Adeeb points the president towards is Amr Moussa, whom the columnist believes can help the president understand the regional and international political scene, as well as predict US foreign policy in the wake of the US presidential elections.
The second hypothetical meeting is to be with constitutional scholar Dr Kamal Abulmagd; according to Adeeb, his moderate Islamic thinking could help determine whether the drafted constitution is in accordance with both the spirit of Islamic law and international treaties and declarations.
The third man to meet is Dr Aly Meselhi, former minister of social solidarity, in order to take his counsel regarding subsidies and how they can reach their intended targets.
The fourth meeting would be with Ahmed Al Zind, head of the Judges club, and would be aimed at attempting to understand and resolve the problem that exists between the Egyptian judiciary and the Constituent Assembly drafting the country’s new constitution.
The final man the president is advised to meet is Attorney General Abdel Meguid Mahmoud, so that the current crisis can be resolved and the general prosecution’s role in post-revolution cases and in providing evidence can be clarified, before cooperation between the presidency and the general prosecution becomes impossible.
Lastly, Adeeb urges the president to make a phone call to Dr Mahmoud Mohieldin, one of the three most important men at the World Bank, to ask for his sincere efforts in aid of the country. The columnist asserts that personal or permanent rivalries do not exist in politics, where practical benefit is king.
Revolution is the epitome of illegality
Abdelfattah writes that revolution is the most extreme form of challenging the law, as it is conducted outside of any legal framework. He believes that revolution is a struggle between those who are in power and those who are not, but that a revolution ends of it does not quickly manage to establish legitimate mechanisms of change and reform.
He claims that revolutionary legitimacy must be quickly translated to legal and institutional legitimacy, or else it loses legitimacy entirely, and that a revolution is unsuccessful if subsequent laws fail to address the problems that triggered it and provide alternatives to their sources.
The constitution, according to the columnist, is the law of all laws, which regulates political struggles and deters corruption. If Egypt succeeds in drafting a modern democratic constitution, then we will have taken a significant step towards development and stability, claims Abdelfattah. He praises the Constituent Assembly’s decision to present the final draft for public debate before the vote, and warns against attempts to disrupt the constitution-writing process through boycotts and any other methods of interference.
They don’t know as well
Emad El-Din Hussein
Hussein attempts to make the point that the Muslim Brotherhood has demonstrated woeful management and administration skills since coming to power, disappointing many who thought they would be more capable and successful than the Mubarak regime.
Hussein points to the latest debacle concerning the attorney general, as well as President Mohamed Morsy’s earlier decision to reinstate parliament, as two examples of the president’s impulsive, experimental approach to ruling a country. He contrasts it with Mubarak’s extremely slow-paced approach to decision making and claims that while it is not desirable to be as sluggish as Mubarak was, it is also worrying to see a president who will take decisions in such an impetuous manner.
The columnist writes that the public believed the brotherhood had a comprehensive project for development, but that it turned out to be mere publicity and propaganda, as revealed by both the president and the Brotherhood’s time in parliament. He claims that the Brotherhood have revealed themselves to be victims to Mubarak’s policy of neglecting and destroying talents and skills, much like the rest of Egypt.
Hussein recommends that the president direct his advisers and cabinet to thoroughly study issues before presenting information to him, in order for him to make the best, most informed decision possible. The columnist also suggests that the president takes another look at his team in order to ensure that it is characterised by both capability and national unity.
An apology is directed towards the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces by the writer, who states that he criticised them constantly for poor political performance, when their successors proved to be just as poor.
Success in deterring producers
Houaidi writes that investors and producers in important industries are abandoning the country’s economy fast, choosing to deposit their money in banks rather than taking a risk on a market that appears to them to lack security.
He claims that two main elements are required in order for producers’ businesses to thrive: efficient manpower and encouraging costs. According to Houaidi, investors now find that both elements are absent in Egypt, prompting them to choose to exit.
The manpower element is impaired by a lack of efficiency, skill and work ethic, compounded by a newfound tendency towards strikes and protests, which are in some cases unlawful. The costs and financing element is lost due to the financial sector’s policies, which are contrary to investor needs, and the Central Bank is accused by the writer of not regulating the relationship between the banks and the investors.
Houaidi claims that there is no conspiracy against the Egyptian economy, but that potential conspirators have gotten more than what they desired.