Amid the inaugural meeting of the Board of Peace (BoP), chaired by U.S. President Donald Trump, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict has once again moved to the forefront–this time under the banner of a “comprehensive plan to end the conflict in Gaza,” endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803. According to Dr. Neil Quilliam, in his commentary published on the website of Chatham House on February 18, 2026, the framework carries serious risks that could extinguish any remaining hope for a unified Palestinian state. In this article, I build on Quilliam’s analysis to demonstrate how the plan replicates the structural failures of the Oslo Accords and how the “New Gaza” proposal unveiled by Jared Kushner in Davos reveals a calculated and deeply consequential vision that threatens the very continuity of Palestinian existence.
First, it is essential to revisit the failures of the 1993 Oslo Accords–failures now reemerging in strikingly similar form. As Quilliam notes, Oslo initially appeared to be a historic breakthrough that would enhance Israeli security while paving the way toward Palestinian statehood. In practice, however, it institutionalized a limited form of Palestinian self-rule while postponing core issues–borders, security, sovereignty, and territory–thereby leaving Israel in effective control. The result was administrative fragmentation between the West Bank and Gaza, deepening political division and weakening Palestinian national cohesion rather than consolidating it.
Today, the Trump plan reproduces these same dynamics. It establishes a multilayered external governance structure: a Board of Peace chaired by Trump; a Gaza Executive Board (GEB) without Palestinian or Israeli members; an International Stabilization Force (ISF); and a National Commission for Gaza Administration (NCAG) selected under joint U.S.-Israeli supervision. This system deprives Palestinians of genuine agency while postponing the question of statehood until after 2027. Oslo, therefore, was not treated as a cautionary lesson but as a governing template, recycled in ways that preserve Israeli dominance. The most consequential flaw lies in the narrow focus on Gaza, which severs its organic connection to the West Bank and reframes the conflict as a localized security challenge rather than a comprehensive national question–precisely the strategic deferral that characterized Oslo.
Second, the “New Gaza” initiative presented by Kushner in Davos last month represents the clearest embodiment of the plan’s strategic ambition and underlying cynicism. As Quilliam underscores, the proposal treats Gaza as vacant beachfront real estate, partitioning it into modernized zones modeled after Dubai and prioritizing economic districts over political rights. Designed without meaningful Palestinian consultation, reconstruction would begin in areas under Israeli control, such as “New Rafah,” effectively granting Israel and its partners decisive authority over residency and access.
The likely outcome is the emergence of “two Gazas”: one sanitized, demilitarized, depoliticized, and tightly monitored–potentially administered by figures such as Mohammed Dahlan–and another marginalized, unstable, and excluded from substantive reconstruction. The strategic maneuver lies in rebranding Gaza as an “economic opportunity,” which Kushner has characterized as a potential “catastrophic success,” while obscuring a renewed process of displacement and dispossession. More profoundly, the plan risks institutionalizing the permanent separation of Gaza from the West Bank, particularly amid accelerated annexation rhetoric by Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich on February 8. Such developments would effectively bury the prospect of Palestinian statehood. This is not peacebuilding; it is a form of modern territorial engineering that leverages economic instruments to redraw political realities.
Third, building on the foregoing analysis, it is essential to shed light on the Middle Eastern perspective.
From a broader regional vantage point, this initiative is not widely perceived in Arab capitals as a peace proposal but rather as a geopolitical restructuring of the region at the expense of the Palestinian cause. Arab states that have engaged in normalization tracks or security partnerships with Israel now confront a difficult strategic dilemma: can they endorse a framework that deepens Palestinian fragmentation and transforms Gaza into a semi-detached economic enclave?
In the Egyptian context specifically, any formula that restructures Gaza without preserving its organic link to the West Bank directly implicates Egyptian national security, given the geographic and demographic interconnections through the Rafah crossing. Proposals for international or regional administration of Gaza outside a unified Palestinian national framework raise concerns about entrenching a quasi-permanent provisional entity–with potential ramifications for Sinai and Egypt’s internal security equilibrium.
In Jordan, where the West Bank portfolio is intrinsically tied to national stability, accelerated annexation places the Kingdom in a structurally precarious position, particularly regarding custodianship over holy sites and demographic balance. Thus, separating Gaza from the West Bank is not viewed as a mere administrative adjustment but as a step that would effectively dismantle the two-state paradigm.
Across parts of the Gulf, the economic rhetoric surrounding reconstruction may resonate with elites who view Gaza’s redevelopment as an investment opportunity. Yet regional experience demonstrates that economic growth absent political sovereignty rarely produces durable stability. Transforming Gaza into a “depoliticized economic zone” risks generating deferred instability rather than sustainable peace.
Regionally, there is also a profound symbolic dimension: the Palestinian issue is not simply a territorial dispute but a foundational component of Arab and Islamic political consciousness. Any framework that neglects this identity-based dimension is likely to encounter broad popular resistance, even if it secures limited official endorsement. Ignoring the symbolic and historical weight of the conflict constitutes a strategic miscalculation that could reignite cycles of regional volatility.
In conclusion, Arab and European states, as Quilliam advises, must exert immediate pressure on Washington to revise this framework before it becomes entrenched. The repetition of Oslo’s structural flaws and the strategic recalibration embedded in Kushner’s proposal are not accidental; they reflect a broader vision aimed at managing and fragmenting the conflict rather than resolving it. Territorial unity and full sovereignty are not rhetorical demands but objective prerequisites for any genuine and lasting peace in the Middle East.
Dr. Marwa El-Shinawy – Academic and writer
