This is not the first time the United States has announced a 21-point plan to end the war in Gaza. The proposal includes personal guarantees from US President Donald Trump that Israel will not annex any West Bank territory, alongside the full release of hostages held by Hamas in a single batch, the reconstruction of Gaza, and the establishment of a governing authority in the Strip with no role for Hamas. This plan differs little from its predecessors. And while the details are the essence of any plan, Israel’s position and response remain the decisive factors.
With the war in Gaza spilling over eastward to Iran, north to Syria and Lebanon, and south to Yemen, Israel finds itself on the verge of envisioning a new future for the state. Research centers in Tel Aviv have even begun drafting what they call “Israel 2,” modeled on France’s successive republics from the First to the Fifth. In the aftermath of October 7 and its repercussions, these think tanks now view themselves as called upon to help shape this new vision, justified by perceived existential threats. Yet there is an unmistakable moment of euphoria in Israel—reminiscent of the post-1967 defeat of Arab armies—especially after its operations in Lebanon, Iran, and even its unprecedented strike on Qatar, an event touted as a strategic milestone that bolsters its self-image as a decisive regional power that has “reshaped” the Middle East.
Israel’s military operations against Hezbollah, Iran, Yemen, Syria, and Qatar have fed this illusion of deterrence. In Iran, for example, Israel claims success in inflicting severe damage on major nuclear facilities in Tehran and eliminating a significant portion of the country’s nuclear scientific leadership. Yet Iran has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions and is once again negotiating to revive the program. While Israel may resume strikes, this would depend on favorable political circumstances both regionally and internationally, as they were in the summer of 2025. Moreover, Iran’s pursuit of advanced air defense systems will make future attacks far more difficult, and US participation in any renewed assault—particularly under a different administration—cannot be guaranteed.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Iran’s key ally, was another outcome Israel viewed positively, opening the skies for direct access to Iran. Israel seized the opportunity to decimate much of the Syrian army and carve out a buffer zone. Yet Turkey also filled the political vacuum, consolidating its proxy rule in Damascus. This has created friction between Turkey and Israel and signaled the rise of a hardline Sunni axis inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, drawing strength from Ankara’s influence and financial support from certain Arab states.
The future of Syria has also become a point of contention between Washington and Jerusalem. Like Turkey, the United States envisions a centralized state, while Israel—favoring minorities such as the Druze and Kurds—advocates for a federation of ethnicities.
Even Hezbollah’s defeat, which severely weakened the Iran-led Shiite axis, does not ensure a fundamental shift in Lebanon. The country’s fragile political system risks collapsing into civil war if force is used to dismantle Hezbollah’s arsenal, despite mounting American pressure.
Meanwhile, repeated strikes against Yemen’s Houthis have granted Israel freer movement across the Asian landmass—from Syria’s northern borders through Iraq to Iran, and down to the Gulf, Arabian Peninsula, and Yemen. Yet the outcome remains unchanged: The Houthis continue to launch missiles and drones at Israel.
More critically, the war in Gaza has not ended. Hamas still controls around 30% of the Strip. The failure to reach a resolution—whether political, military, or through hostage negotiations—has prolonged the conflict and eroded Israel’s legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Hamas’s resilience in Gaza City, despite devastation and starvation among civilians, is seen as a symbolic victory for the resistance.
At present, Israel appears exhausted, unable to secure a definitive victory over Hamas. Gaza will ultimately determine who is perceived as victorious in this war. Internal divisions—fueled by contentious judicial reforms and the government’s handling of the hostage crisis—paint a picture of a fractured, weakened society. This raises a serious question: will Israelis truly send their sons and daughters to fight for long-term political goals in a region where they claim to be an indispensable power?
It is deeply unfortunate that Israelis forget they live in a small country. This is evident in the limited manpower available to the IDF. Israel’s economy is simply too small to meet all its needs. Like other small states, it relies on global markets and imports—especially arms, which are dictated not by supply and demand but by political dynamics. As a result, dependence on US support grows ever more critical. When nearly half of Senate Democrats vote to restrict arms supplies to Israel, alarm bells ring. American support across political, security, and economic domains carries existential weight. Though Israel’s standing in the US remains strong, troubling trends are on the rise.
In today’s era of globalization—once rapidly embraced by Israel—momentum has slowed due to political realities and atrocities in Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently announced a so-called “Spartan economy” to cope with the war’s toll, urging self-reliance after mounting political and economic isolation caused by the war in Gaza, now entering its third year. Critics at home, however, view the plan as mere political theater to relieve pressure. Either way, Tel Aviv’s illusions of success fade with each passing day, while ordinary Israelis fear waking up to disaster.
Israel must also recognize it exists within a vast Islamic sphere of 1.5 billion people. True, the Islamic world is fragmented, and political or military mobilization against Israel is not easy. Yet hostility toward Israel among Arab and Muslim populations is growing sharper—and such sentiment will not dissipate quickly.
The illusion of Israeli power—that advanced airstrikes and unlimited US support could reengineer political entities beyond its borders—has not brought security or stability. The states targeted by Israel will remain security threats in both the near and distant future. The Middle East itself has not truly changed: it remains mired in conflict, where force is still the rule of the game, and extremism and nuclear proliferation continue to spread. Peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the Abraham Accords, and ties with Central Asian nations have not delivered lasting stability. The only path to true integration into the region is through resolving the Palestinian question on its own soil.
Dr. Hatem Sadek – Professor at Helwan University
