Over the past two decades, we have witnessed the collapse of several Arab states — from Iraq to Yemen, Libya, Syria, and, most recently, Sudan. It is increasingly clear that none of these nations is likely to return to its former state. In parallel, regional and international powers have been steadily working to impose a new model of statehood — one tailored to their strategic interests. The Iraqi experiment faltered, unable to overcome internal divisions. Libya stagnated, caught in a web of foreign interference and conflicting personal agendas. Meanwhile, Yemen and Sudan have spiraled into uncontrolled freefall.
Against this bleak backdrop, Syria stands at a critical juncture, with early signs of a new state beginning to take shape. This emerging model appears to be a Sunni Islamist state with jihadist undertones — notably disconnected from regional political, military, or historical causes. Its presumed role is to maintain internal stability and secure what remains of its borders. This state-building project rests on three pillars: first, a complete overhaul of Syria’s defence and security doctrine; second, the prioritization of economic support; and third, the granting of substantive — not merely formal — civil and political rights to minorities.
Of these, the first is the most alarming, as it defines the core identity of the new state. Since the fall of the former regime and the rise of Ahmad Al-Sharaa and his foreign-backed faction, Syria has witnessed the dismantling of its national army. Entangled in the civil war through the orders of its former political and military leadership, the army’s collapse left behind a profound security vacuum. Israel quickly seized the opportunity, launching a sustained campaign of airstrikes that systematically dismantled Syria’s remaining military infrastructure. Al-Sharaa’s promise to build a “professional national army” uniting all armed factions under one banner has so far proven to be rhetorical — aimed at domestic consumption rather than real implementation. Rebuilding a cohesive army amid a power vacuum is, in truth, nearly impossible — a lesson painfully illustrated by post-2003 Iraq, when US administrator Paul Bremer disbanded the Iraqi army, leaving the country struggling ever since to reestablish a credible force.
Even if a new army were formed, its doctrine would inevitably shift from defending national borders to preserving the regime — effectively transforming it into an internal security force. This shift is, in fact, the foremost priority on the agenda. Agreement on this principle alone could open the door to Syria’s reintegration into the international community — particularly through normalization with Tel Aviv.
In recent months, Al-Sharaa has held several meetings with leaders of armed factions to discuss their integration into the new army. However, field reports and intelligence assessments suggest that many of these groups remain unwilling — at least in the short term — to pledge full loyalty or submit to centralized command.
Over the years, more than 60 armed groups have operated across northern and northwestern Syria. Over half are aligned with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, estimated to include 70,000–80,000 fighters, primarily tasked with confronting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. Other groups operate through temporary alliances driven by immediate necessity, while some remain entirely independent. These factions differ ideologically — from moderate to hardline Islamist — and include foreign jihadist fighters. This diversity complicates efforts to foster integration and loyalty, not only between groups but even within them.
International pressure, especially from the United States, has intensified to exclude foreign jihadist fighters from any leadership roles in Syria’s future military. Washington views their involvement as a direct threat to regional stability and a sign of Al-Sharaa’s true intentions. Failure to address this concern risks derailing Syria’s fragile path toward international rehabilitation — and may delay the lifting of sanctions critical for reconstruction.
In practical terms, since the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel has taken every opportunity to inflict maximum damage on Syria’s military capabilities — conducting hundreds of air raids and destroying roughly 90% of the air, land, and naval assets inherited from the old regime. Rebuilding Syria’s military must therefore be rooted in a coherent national defence strategy — one that clearly defines the military’s role, identifies enemies and regional threats, and articulates foreign policy toward both Arab neighbors and the wider international community. Clarifying who is friend and who is foe will determine the military’s identity, structure, and purpose.
It is essential that the goal of creating a “professional national army” not be reduced to a technical matter of procurement and training. Rather, it must be a national institution capable of realizing the Syrian people’s aspirations for security, stability, and prosperity. That goal remains distant, as factions remain divided over the shape of the new military project. Realizing this vision requires a comprehensive national plan — one that transcends ethnic and sectarian divides.
Historically, a strong, professional army — with academically qualified, nationally loyal leadership — was central to maintaining national security and countering external and internal threats. In this new model, the army must also help rebuild trust between citizens and the state, foster a sense of civic belonging, and support transitional justice and national reconciliation. This includes assisting in the prosecution of war criminals and human rights violators from the previous era.
The current leadership in Damascus intends to train between 300,000 and 400,000 fighters in phases, starting with an initial wave of 80,000. Yet serious obstacles remain, especially regarding arms procurement and military training. Though global arms markets are accessible, they demand vast financial resources and are tightly monitored by the United States, Israel, and other powers. For Syria — a direct neighbor of Israel — acquiring weapons without encountering serious political barriers will be exceedingly difficult. Countries that import US-origin weapons are prohibited from re-exporting them to Syria without US approval and Israel’s tacit consent. Even potential suppliers like Turkey or Eastern and Western nations would likely impose political or security conditions that Al-Sharaa’s regime may find unacceptable.
These challenges — compounded by entrenched regional and international interference on all sides — present profound, possibly insurmountable, obstacles to rebuilding not just a Syrian army, but the Syrian state itself. And so, perhaps, it shall remain only a dream.
That grim prospect was recently underscored by a US Secretary of State’s warning before Congress: that Al-Sharaa’s regime could collapse much sooner than anticipated, with the likelihood of a renewed, large-scale civil war erupting within weeks. His statement followed a controversial meeting between President Donald Trump and Al-Sharaa in Riyadh.
The Syrian dream, it seems, remains suspended — between the rubble of a shattered nation and the ambitions of foreign powers.
Dr. Hatem Sadek – Professor at Helwan University
