Author: TheConversation

Coup in Gabon: Ali Bongo the eighth west African leader to be ousted by military in two years

Gabon’s President, Ali Bongo, has become the latest in a string of African leaders to be ousted by a military coup in recent years. Bongo, who had just won a third term in power, was ousted by a junta of senior officers who have named General Brice Oligui Nguema – the former head of the presidential guard and Bongo’s cousin – as the country’s new “interim president”.

The coup in Gabon is the eighth in west and central Africa since 2020, and the second – after Niger – in as many months. He is being held under house arrest from where he made an emotional plea for help for him and his family from international “friends of Gabon” to “make noise”.

Deposed Gabonese president, Ali Bongo, makes an emotional plea for help after being placed under house arrest.

The coup appears to have brought an end to his family’s 55-year hold on power in Gabon. His father, El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, was president for almost 42 years from 1967. When he died in hospital in 2009, his son won the presidency in an election criticised at the time as little more than a dynastic handover.

News of Bongo’s removal from power was greeted by many with jubilation, with crowds taking to the streets in support of the military junta. There has long been talk of corruption in Gabon, with many believing that revenues from the country’s considerable oil wealth are not being distributed evenly, leaving many in poverty.

Gabon, a member of Opec, produces more than 200,000 barrels of oil a day, but – despite having one of Africa’s highest incomes per capita – more than one-third of the population of 2.3 million are thought to be living below the poverty line, according to the UN Development Programme.

Gabon’s contested election

The result of the August 26 election, which appeared to hand Bongo his third term in power, was widely disputed. Before polls even closed there were complaints that many of the polling stations did not have papers bearing the name of Bongo’s main opponent, former university professor and one-time education minister, Albert Ondo Ossa.

There were reported long delays in polling stations being opened, the internet was shut down, and a curfew was imposed as polls closed. It took three days for the electoral authorities to announce that Bongo had won with 64.3% of the vote compared with 30.8% for Ossa. The coup is reported to have taken place within an hour of the results being announced.

This was not an attempt to unseat Bongo. In 2016, there were outbreaks of violence which resulted in more than 50 deaths after an extremely tight election result which Bongo won by 49.8% of the vote against his main opponent, Jean Ping with 48.2%.

There was also a coup attempt in January 2019, when a group of army officers tried to take power while Bongo was undergoing treatment for a stroke in Morocco. The 2019 botched coup attempt was an early signal of Bongo’s weakening grip on the military. He responded in December 2019 by arresting his chief of staff, Brice Laccruche Alihanga, on corruption charges.

But this time, the loud celebrations in the capital Libreville would seem to indicate that, for now at least, the military junta enjoys a level of popular support.

Any unrest is likely to be met with a military clampdown. Gabon’s human rights record has been mixed, with reports of abuse and violence, especially against dissident voices after the 2016 election. All of which have serious consequences for governance and stability in the short to long term, both in Gabon and across the region. Under Bongo, Gabon had a Freedom House score of 20 out of 100, reflecting the tight grip held by Bongo through his control of the military. Now the military has control.

International reaction

The African Union has responded by suspending Gabon’s membership and, if the EU and other western countries react the same way as they have to other recent coups, sanctions are likely to be imposed. France, which has maintained close economic, diplomatic and military ties with Gabon, and has 400 soldiers stationed in the country, has roundly condemned the coup and called for the election result to be respected, as has the UK. The US has called the events in Gabon “deeply concerning”, while the EU has said the coup would be discussed by ministers this week, according to its top diplomat, Josep Borrell, who said: “If this is confirmed, it’s another military coup, which increases instability in the whole region.”

Gabon is not a member of west Africa’s regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). But the events in Libreville will put pressure on the regional body which is already discussing ways to reverse the recent coup in Niger which occurred barely a month ago.

Troubled region: political instability is rife across central and west Africa. Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock

The coup puts France in a difficult position, given its close relationship with Ali Bongo, and it might feel pressure to intervene militarily, given that Ecowas already has its hands full with Niger. French influence in a region it once saw as its imperial backyard has taken a battering in the past two years with coups in francophone countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and now Niger.

Russia, on the other hand, has been steadily trying to strengthen its influence in the region and might see an opportunity to gain further influence by supporting Gabon’s military junta. China, too, is keen to play a growing role in the region – although Beijing tends mainly to concentrate on building economic ties on the resource-rich continent.

But the aftermath of recent events in Libreville will no doubt be watched most closely by the various other longstanding rulers in the region whose democratic mandate might be weaker than their dependence on their armies or foreign mercenaries to keep them in power.

Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

September 4, 2023
What would an ancient Egyptian corpse have smelled like? Pine, balsam and bitumen – if you were nobility

In 1900 – some 22 years before he discovered the tomb of Tutankhamen – British archaeologist Howard Carter opened another tomb in the Valley of the Kings. In tomb KV42, Carter found the remains of a ancient Egyptian noblewoman called Senetnay, who died around 1450 BCE.

More than a century later, a French perfumer has recreated one of the scents used in Senetnay’s mummification. And the link between these two events is our research, published today in Scientific Reports, which delves into the ingredients of this ancient Egyptian balm recipe.

Recreating the smells of a disappeared world

Our team drew upon cutting-edge technologies in chemistry to reconstruct ancient scents from jars of Senetnay found in the ancient Egyptian tomb.

We used three variations of chromatographic and mass spectrometric techniques, which work by breaking samples down into individual molecules. Specific substances have different assemblages of molecules. Based on these characteristic compounds and through comparison to known reference materials, we identified the different ingredients.

After the excavation by Carter, two of Senetnay’s jars recovered from the ancient Egyptian tomb made their way to Germany. So, in 2020, we approached the Museum August Kestner in Hannover about the possibility of analysing the jars with these new methods.

These jars are known as canopic jars. They are made of limestone and were used to store the mummified organs of the ancient Egyptian elite. Somewhere along the way, however, Senetnay’s jars lost their contents. All that remained of the ancient Egyptian mummified organs were faint residues on the bottom of the jars.

Remarkably, chemical analyses allow scientists to take such trace remains and reconstruct the original contents.

An ancient Egyptian ingredients list

Our analysis revealed the balms used to coat and preserve Senetnay’s organs contained a blend of beeswax, plant oil, fats, bitumen, an unidentified balsamic substance, and resins from trees of the pine family (most likely larch).

One other substance was narrowed down to either a resin called dammar – found in coniferous and hardwood trees in South-East and East Asia – or Pistacia tree resin.

The results were exciting; these were the richest and most complex balms ever identified for this early ancient Egyptian time period. It was clear a lot of effort had gone into making the balms. This suggests Senetnay, who was the wet nurse of the future Pharaoh Amenhotep II, had been an important figure in her day.

The findings also contribute to growing chemical evidence that the ancient Egyptians went far and wide to source ingredients for mummification balms, drawing on extensive trade networks that stretched into areas beyond their realm.

Since trees of the pine family are not endemic to Egypt, the possible larch resin must have come from somewhere further afield, most likely Central Europe.

This map shows the distribution of potential conifer resin sources in relation to the Valley of the Kings. You can see larches (which belong to the genus Larix, of the family Pinaceae) aren’t found anywhere near Egypt. B. Huber et al., 2023, CC BY-SA

The most puzzling ingredient was the one identified as either Pistacia or dammar resin. If the ingredient was Pistacia – which is derived from the resin of pistachio trees – it likely came from some coastal region of the Mediterranean. But if it was dammar, it would have derived from much farther away in South-East Asia.

Recent analysis of balms from the site of Saqqara identified dammar in a later balm dating to the first millennium BCE. If the presence of dammar resin is confirmed in Senetnay’s case, this would suggest ancient Egyptians had access to this South-East Asian resin via long-distance trade, almost a millennium earlier than previously thought.

A perfume for the ages

Senetnay’s balm would not only have scented her remains, but also the workshop in which it was made and the proceedings of her burial rites – perfuming the air with pine, balsam, vanilla and other exotic notes. The vanilla scent comes from a compound called coumarin, and from vanillic acid, and in this case likely reflects the degradation of woody tissue.

Due to the volatile nature of scents, however, Senetnay’s unique scents gradually vanished once her remains were deposited in the Valley of the Kings.

Earlier this year, we began a collaboration with perfumer Carole Calvez and sensory museologist Sofia Collette Ehrich to bring Senetnay’s lost scent back to life.

The results of this effort will go on display at the Moesgaard Museum in Denmark in October, as part of its new exhibition: Egypt – Obsessed with Life.

The new olfactory display will be like a time machine for the nose. It will provide a unique and unparalleled window into the smells of ancient Egypt and the scents used to perfume and preserve elite individuals such as Senetnay.

Such immersive experiences provide new ways of engaging with the past and help broaden participation, particularly for visually impaired people.

Nicole Boivin, Professor, Max Planck Institute of Geoanthropology and Barbara Huber, Doctoral Researcher, Department of Archaeology, Max Planck Institute of Geoanthropology

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

September 2, 2023
Gabon coup: Bongo’s rule ended by failed promises and shifting alliances

The Bongo family’s 56 year hold on power in Gabon was abruptly brought to an end with a military coup on 30 August. The military takeover happened hours after election results were announced that gave Ali Bongo Ondimba a third term. Gyldas Ofoulhast-Othamot, a professor of public and international affairs with published research on Gabon, explains factors that may have contributed to the ouster.

Did Gabon’s recent election stack up as ‘free and fair’?

The presidential election on 26 August was the sixth since the formal end of the one-party state in 1990. Like the others, it was contentious from the start.

The particular issue this time was that three elections (presidential, parliamentary and local) took place at once. This had never been done before. In the context of autocratic and dynastic rule in Gabon, it was bound to be problematic.

It’s no surprise that the poll was reported to be chaotic. It appears to have been a mixture of ineptitude and wilful incompetence and chaos. Polls opened late. Some opposition ballots were said to be missing. As a result voting had to be extended in some areas.

Finally, immediately after the vote, the internet was cut and a curfew put in place, rarely a sign of a regime confident that it has won at the polls.

The many constitutional, legal and electoral changes before and after the elections severely undermined the integrity of the vote.

Perhaps the most contentious change was the last-minute addition of the single ballot. This meant that voters who selected a member of parliament automatically voted for the presidential candidate in the same party – even if it wasn’t their first choice.

Collectively, all the changes seemed designed to give the incumbent the advantage. They made for flawed elections.

Finally, the result, which gave Ali Bongo Ondimba the victory with over 64% of votes cast, was announced while people were asleep. No advance notification was given as it had been in previous contests.

All signs were that it was a rigged election.

The leaders of Gabon’s junta used that as a justification for their takeover.

What are the weaknesses in Gabon’s political makeup?

Gabon became independent from France on 17 August 1960. That’s 63 years ago. Except for its first president, Leon M’ba Minko (1960-1967), the Bongo family has governed the country for 56 years – (Omar Bongo Ondimba from 1967 to 2009 and Ali Bongo Ondimba from then on until 30 August 2023).

Political domination by a single family is the country’s main weakness. The political system has been tailored to serve the interests of one family only and its domestic and foreign allies.

In this context, it becomes difficult to engineer the types of reforms necessary for a country to modernise and regenerate itself.

Bongo’s father maintained control through patronage and balancing the involvement of various societal (ethnic) groups. But in the 1990s this became more difficult because of the return of multipartyism and a decline in oil reserves which made patronage more challenging.

In some ways, Ali Bongo Ondimba’s attempt to go beyond the political equilibrium created by his father doomed him. He promised reforms and a state that would improve the lives of all the people. But he failed to deliver.

With ever shifting domestic elite alliances and popular demand for better living conditions and for the Bongo regime to end, it was only a matter of time before the military switched sides. It was that or continued repression with the potential for more blood being spilled, as happened in 2016.

What about the economy? How are ordinary people faring?

Well endowed in natural resources, Gabon is regarded by the World Bank as an upper-middle-income country with a GDP per capita of US$8,820. This is among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. Gabon used to be called the “Kuwait of Africa” because of its oil and natural resources wealth and its small population of 2.3 million.

But its population remains poor. Only a small elite has benefited from the country’s wealth. Unemployment is said to be as high as 37%, with 35% of Gabonese living below the poverty line of US$2 a day.

When Ali Bongo Ondimba came to power in 2009, he promised economic reforms. But by 2016, economic stagnation was still the norm. Power cuts are frequent, running tap water has become a rare commodity, and inequalities have increased.

What history does the military have in the country’s affairs?

This is the third coup in Gabon’s history.

The first was in 1964 under President Leon M’ba Minko. France intervened to reinstate him.

The last two coups have been under Ali Bongo Ondimba. In 2019, it was led by junior officers and was short-lived. Nevertheless, it exposed the frailties of his regime, especially after he suffered a stroke in Saudi Arabia.

This time it appears that the military brass are all in, at least those who matter in the Republican Guard (GR in French).

In my view the military has been central to the Bongo regime maintaining its power for all those years.

For instance, in 1993 and 2016 when the Bongo regime was under duress, only military intervention and repression of opposition groups ensured its survival.

Also, the loyalty of the members of the state security and defence apparatus has always been well rewarded. The Republican Guard, the most equipped and well financed of all the armed forces, exemplifies that.

The difference now is that it has decided to be king rather than staying behind the scenes as the kingmaker.

Its aims are not clear yet – democratic and republican or authoritarian rule.

What difference is this coup likely to make?

General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, the leader of the junta, does not appear to be related to the Bongo family.

He entered the Bongo circle through his relationship with the long-time former commander of the Republican Guard, André Oyini. Over time, he rose through the ranks to become Omar Bongo Ondimba’s last military aide.

Given that proximity to the Bongo family, it looks like a palace revolution rather than true political change. Ali Bongo Ondimba was the heir of a political system built by his father since the 1960s. That system has not collapsed overnight.

Yet the junta, and more generally the security and defence forces, will have to take into account political, economic and social decay and popular aspirations when deciding the path forward. If not, instability will become the norm.

Gyldas A. Ofoulhast-Othamot, Assistant professor of political science, St. Petersburg College

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

September 1, 2023
Sylvia Mdunyelwa, one of South Africa’s great jazz vocalists, kept music traditions alive

If Miriam Makeba is hailed as the South African vocalist of her generation who brilliantly embraced (and actually shaped) global music sounds, and Sathima Bea Benjamin as the experimenter who entranced the modern jazz scene in Europe and the US, then Ncediwe Sylvia Mdunyelwa joins that pantheon of late, great South African singers as the consummate vocal classicist. Known affectionately in her home city of Cape Town as “Mama Kaap”, Mdunyelwa passed away on 25 August at the age of 74.

As a researcher who documents historical and current South African jazz and popular music, I believe Mdunyelwa merits recognition not only for the regard she won from fellow players, but also for her activism as a community music educator and advocate for South African jazz.

At the core of her music was a fierce insistence on respect for the tradition – of the great American jazz singers such as Ella Fitzgerald and Sarah Vaughan as well as the traditional music of her isiXhosa-speaking community – and for the song.

Who was Sylvia Mdunyelwa?

Born in the Cape Town township of Langa, Mdunyelwa grew up in those traditions during the 1950s and 1960s, as white minority rule and apartheid were clamping down on black political activity.

Her uncle, Aspro Sipoyo, led the close-harmony vocal group The Semitones and her sister was a jazz singer. Her home became a meeting place for musicians, including bassist Victor Ntoni. Family gatherings sounded loud with religious songs; Fitzgerald, Vaughan and another US jazz vocalist, Carmen McRae, were all regulars on the record player. Singing along, the young Nce became a singer even before she had articulated the ambition to be one.

Her first employment in the late 1960s was at Cape Town’s Space Theatre as a receptionist. The Space provided a stage for independent and often politically challenging drama, for poets and for music. There she grew her experience as a vocalist and developed a formidable acting career.

Sunday afternoon jazz sessions at the theatre brought Mdunyelwa into contact with pianist Merton Barrow (credited by many Cape Town jazz players as unstinting with advice and guidance) and drummer Maurice Gawronsky. By her early 20s she was the vocalist with the regular band there, the Victor Ntoni Sextet, as well as guesting with other Cape Town jazz stars including the Ngcukana Brothers, Winston “Mankunku” Ngozi and many more.

But she was also drawn into some of the theatre productions The Space hosted. This experience led to her talent being noticed and to many later acting appearances, including parts in the US movie Freedom Road, the South African feature film Born to Win and numerous TV series.

Her passion to pass on all this skill and knowledge to younger generations led her into community arts education. And that, in turn, led to a 1990 Canada trip as the head of a youth group, and eventually to a bursary to study at UCLA. Tours followed, including to the Berlin Jazz Festival and to Colombia in Latin America (where she was awarded for her community work in Cape Town).

Albums

Mdunyelwa released two albums, the 1998 African Diva, recorded live at the National Arts Festival in Makhanda (then Grahamstown), and the 2000 studio recording Ingoma, on the international Blue Note jazz label.

African Diva is still available on the music streaming service Spotify, but, as she told South African jazz writer Warren Ludski a couple of years back, “I was asked if I got royalties from Spotify. I got nothing from Spotify. I didn’t even know about Spotify.”

Ingoma doesn’t seem to be available anywhere. A reissue is long overdue – ideally through a label that will make sure Mdunyelwa’s estate and legacy foundation actually do see some benefit.

In later years, the singer continued to perform in and around Cape Town. She also worked as a jazz broadcaster at Cape Town community radio station P4 and served on the board of the jazz and classical music specialist station Fine Music Radio.

But increasingly her passion was for community education and activism. She served on her local street committee in Langa, and composed the impassioned anthem Where are the Children Now? to draw attention to the situation of Cape Town’s young people, caught in the crossfire of poverty, family insecurity and crime.

Legacy

Mdunyelwa was a classicist of South African jazz song. Melody came first; lyrics were delivered with crystal clarity and emotional force; swing centred her versions of American classics (listen, for example to her version of Easy Street in Berlin). But there was always a compelling subtext of respect for Xhosa culture, the isiXhosa language and that community’s musicality.

She created new isiXhosa lyrics for the US jazz standard Stormy Weather, which became a favourite with her audiences. It all comes together beautifully on her rendition of the South African jazz standard Lakutshon’iLanga, which, for many people, remains the best ever. She left a tangible legacy in the skills of younger musicians she inspired and mentored.

Mdunyelwa harboured no illusions about the kind of support musicians could expect in South Africa. She told Ludski:

Forget about government. They will promise you something and you’ll be dead before you get anything. When you die as a legend or diva or icon, they will come and talk at your graveside. I don’t want that.

Nevertheless, I hope she receives multiple official tributes, accompanied by concrete support to ensure her legacy as a guardian of and activist-educator about the South African jazz tradition, however belated it all may now be.

This article is adapted from an obituary first published on the author’s blog

Gwen Ansell, Associate of the Gordon Institute for Business Science, University of Pretoria

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

August 31, 2023
DRC: rising Twirwaneho rebel group highlights the unending volatility of the country’s east

The three-decade conflict in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has led to the proliferation of hundreds of armed groups. With the violence appearing to take an ethnic slant, several groups have emerged claiming to be protecting their communities from attacks. One such group is the Twirwaneho, which has become more active since 2019. Christopher P. Davey, who has extensively studied the drivers of conflict in eastern DRC, explains how the Twirwaneho’s claim of communal self-defence highlights the fractured nature of Congolese politics.

What is the conflict in the DRC all about?

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been a theatre of increasingly violent conflict since the Rwandan genocide of 1994 pushed over a million refugees across the common border. Rwanda’s efforts to capture those responsible for the genocide sparked two wars in two wars. Violence, driven by armed groups, has been persistent since.

Central to Congo’s politics is a broken relationship between the seat of government in Kinshasa, the underrepresented social and economic groups in the eastern region, and external parties. Added to this mix are transnational armed groups, foreign militaries, the UN peacekeeping mission and Congolese state actors like the military.

This has resulted in the world’s longest-standing refugee crisis. It has also led to the proliferation and fragmentation of dozens of armed groups in the eastern region.

One of these groups is the Twirwaneho, a Banyamulenge – or South Kivu-based Congolese Tutsi – self-defence/armed group.

This group is important to understand because its rising profile demonstrates the unending nature of Congo’s war.

Who are the Twirwaneho?

The Banyamulenge are a minority group in South Kivu, eastern DRC, who have faced attacks based on their ethnicity. Formed in the early 2010s, Twirwaneho (meaning “let’s defend ourselves” in the Banyamulenge language) is a contemporary response by mutinying national army officers to continued conflict and local self-defence needs within the Banyamulenge community.

The overlap between self-defence and armed groups is not unique to the DRC. My research on the history of Banyamulenge soldiers shows that the gumino (“let’s stay here”) self-defence tradition was part the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s international campaign in the late 1980s. It was used to raise funds and recruit for the Rwandan civil war (1990-1994).

This led to a generation of fighters trained by the Rwandan Patriotic Front who got into the ranks of various armed groups across both Congo wars.

These groups include Twirwaneho. Its leader is Michel “Makanika” Rukunda, who was once in the Congolese national army before he mutinied in 2019. He transformed Twirwaneho militias into a militarily coordinated, and internationally represented and funded, fighting force. But he is also accused of human rights violations that have placed him on the European Union sanctions list.

The Twirwaneho’s direct role in national politics is minimal. However, the group has become a symbol of defiance for both the community it claims to defend and those who see Tutsis as foreign invaders. Also, a report from the UN group of experts on the DRC hints towards collaboration between Twirwaneho and the Rwanda-supported M23.

Is the group keeping the peace or fuelling conflict?

The Twirwaneho claim that neighbouring armed groups and DRC national army make up a coalition launching counterattacks on Banyamulenge villages. This is in reprisal for Twirwaneho operations against the military and other armed groups and connected populations.

My research shows that the Twirwaneho are related to, but distinct within, an array of armed groups in DRC engaged in a complex political, economic and at times existential struggle.

During Nairobi fieldwork, to understand more about the international side of the movement I met three young former rebels who had fled the Twirwaneho. They joined the group after their schools closed following increased local conflict. Graduating from students to soldiers, they fought this anti-Twirwaneho coalition. Echoing his community’s sentiment, one former Twirwaneho officer told me they are “not an armed group”. He emphasised this point:

… I was seeing myself as a civilian who decided to come and protect my community.

Inherent in the Twirwaneho’s fight are claims of stopping a Tutsi genocide in the DRC, also made by the M23. However, increased fighting across North and South Kivu has exacerbated violence against all civilians.

What’s behind the group’s rising profile?

Makanika as the emerging leader of the group has instilled discipline and “patriotism”. In my fieldwork I heard consistent claims of insufficient promotion and pay for Banyamulenge soldiers in the national army and persecution of their people. These claims became reasons for joining, along with a narrowing of options for traditional livelihoods.

As command centred under Makanika, his diaspora reputation grew. Many Banyamulenge in the US and African Great Lakes region credit him with preserving the community. Young Banyamulenge men have left families and careers to join the Twirwaneho. The group recruits school children, pressures community members to join and draws on existing self-defence groups.

Coordinated by the Mahoro Peace Association, the Banyamulenge diaspora has contributed hundreds of thousands of US dollars to displaced families in South Kivu. This is not an uncommon practice across other groups in the country.

The peace association asserts it does not actively raise money for Twirwaneho, but its leadership advocates for fighting to reclaim the homeland. This implicitly encourages support.

Many Banyamulenge do not consider any funds sent as support for an armed group. Rather, it is seen as mobilisation for the survival of the community.

What’s the end game?

What the Twirwaneho want is a complex question. Their social media posts broadcast goals of Banyamulenge peace and security in Congo. Yet, violence in the DRC is not a simple ethnic conflict. Although many Banyamulenge support the group, they are divided on how its goals are to be accomplished.

It is easy to see how a diaspora is willing to support the survival of their community. However, armed groups typically result in continued violence and military competition: rebels fight for material gains that do not translate into increased security for civilians.

This piece was written in collaboration with researchers at the Conflict and Human Security Research Group (GEC-SH/CERUKI).

Christopher P. Davey, Charles E. Scheidt Visiting Assistant Professor of Genocide Studies and Prevention, Clark University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

August 31, 2023
Kofi Ansah left Ghana to become a world famous fashion designer – how his return home boosted the industry
Kofi Ansah: In the 1950s and 1960s, young Africans were assisted financially by their governments to study in western countries in the hope they would return to contribute to nation building. Individuals who qualified abroad and returned home formed the educated elites of immediate post-independent Africa.

Over the years, the demography of such migrants has changed to include professionals who after graduation at home move abroad in search of employment and remain there permanently. This loss of human talent and skills – the “brain drain” – is arguably one of Africa’s key developmental challenges.

The migration of highly skilled professionals such as doctors, nurses, engineers and academics from Africa has serious economic, political and social implications for development.

But there is another side to the migration of skilled people. That is “brain gain” – the return migration of professionals – and “brain circulation” – temporary migration of professionals between countries. This is not well documented, especially in the case of African countries.

This is the gap we sought to fill, using a case study of the late Ghanaian fashion designer, Kofi Ansah.

Ansah’s impact on Ghanaian fashion was immense because of the timing and context of his return in 1992. He had built a successful career for 20 years in the UK and the future looked promising. On the other hand, the country he returned to was undergoing profound political and economic transformation. Ghana was transitioning from military rule to a civilian government. Political tension was high, linked to an economic downturn following structural adjustment programmes adopted in the 1980s. But Ansah chose to relocate his budding career to Ghana.

His case demonstrates how the knowledge and expertise migrants gather through international career mobility can be converted into assets at an individual, national and international level. Returning migrants can transform traditional industries into modern, globalised ones.

Transforming Ghana’s fashion industry

We are researchers in sociology, African studies and geography who have been studying how internal and external migration and spatial context influence cultural and creative practice in Ghana. For the Kofi Ansah case study we interviewed 31 Ghanaian fashion designers whose career journeys had been directly and indirectly influenced by him. These interviews are supplemented by information from social media dedicated to Ansah and his works.

Kofi Ansah, who died in 2014, was from a creative family. His elder sister, Felicia Abban, was the official photographer of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first president. His elder brother, Kwaw Ansah, is an acclaimed film writer, director and producer.

After completing his secondary education, Kofi enrolled in the Chelsea School of Art in the United Kingdom to study fashion design. He made his first fashion headline after he designed a beaded dress for Princess Anne. Subsequently, he worked for several successful British fashion brands, including Gerald Austin and Guy Laroche, before establishing his own studio in central London in 1980.

Despite his early success on the UK fashion scene, Ansah returned to Ghana in 1992 to get fresh inspiration and “try to show people that we can use our fabrics for other things … We just have to work on it and make it commercial,” he explained during an interview.

The way cloth was produced locally, using strip loom technology, limited the volume of production. And the conventional styling of clothes limited their patronage. These were some of the features Ansah sought to change.

Ansah transformed Ghana’s fashion industry in four areas:
- Fabrics and design: His modern designs used African traditional cloth, such as kente and bogolanfini. Linked to these style changes was his collaboration with Woodin and the Ghana Textiles Production, two textile producing companies, to introduce the sale of fabric in single yards instead of the standard six yards. This made the cloth more accessible and functional. It led to the production of casual clothes, such as skirts, blouses, shirts, shorts and trousers, for men and women. He then introduced ready-to-wear clothing at Woodin.
- Accessories: Ansah was also passionate about promoting fashion accessories made with local materials. These included wood, raffia and his personal favourite, calabash. His runway designs always included stunning accessories. The use of prominent accessories has now become an integral element of African fashion shows.
- Production: Ansah was instrumental in the introduction of the Friday African wear policy in Ghana. This was aimed at promoting the wearing of local bespoke garments in workplaces on Fridays. Ansah used his friendship with then minister for trade and industry, Alan Kyeremanten, to push his idea to democratise and regularise the use of wax print. Ansah also influenced fashion production by employing international marketing strategies like fashion shows and exhibitions. He thus opened Ghanaian fashion to international audiences by using globally accepted techniques.
- Human capital: More importantly, Ansah’s vision to grow a lasting and successful industry propelled him to mentor many of Ghana’s finest contemporary designers. He partnered with international agencies to launch mentorship programmes for young designers.
One such programme was the Web Young Designers Hub, financed by the French Embassy and coordinated by Ansah and Franca Sozzani, former editor of Vogue Italia. Another project spearheaded by Ansah was the Ethical Fashion Initiative, a partnership between the United Nations and the Presidential Special Initiative programme. These programmes and the exposure that came with them positioned contemporary designers to engage in “brain circulation.”

By participating in projects, young designers had the opportunity to travel to other countries and learn about aspects of fashion such as fabric production and event organisation. Such travel was geared towards acquiring knowledge that would have an impact on Ghana’s fashion industry.

These engagements helped young fashion designers build networks with designers across the globe.

Ansah’s impact

The Ghanaian fashion industry is making its mark globally. Steve French and other young designers are recognised for their creative works and talents. Garments made by Ghanaian designers like Duaba Serwaa and Christie Brown are worn by stars such as Lupita Nyongo and Beyonce respectively. Young Ghanaians, too, proudly wear African clothes for all occasions. The current status of Ghana’s fashion industry is largely due to the efforts of Kofi Ansah.

Adwoa Owusuaa Bobie, Research Fellow, Center for Cultural and African Studies, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST); Akosua Keseboa Darkwah, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Ghana, and Katherine V. Gough, Professor of Human Geography, Loughborough University

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August 31, 2023
Niger’s resource paradox: what should make the country rich has made it a target for predators

A month after the coup in Niger that toppled the democratically elected civilian government of Mohamed Bazoum, the country’s neighbours are still debating the possibility of military intervention.

The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) – a coalition of west African countries, which includes Niger – has said it intends to send in a taskforce to topple the military junta led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, which ousted Bazoum on July 26.

But the plan to intervene is not without controversy. Niger, a landlocked nation, shares borders with Mali, Algeria, Libya, Chad, Benin and Burkina Faso. These countries have expressed solidarity with the military junta and have committed to oppose any potential Ecowas intervention.

France, which occupied Niger from 1890 until independence in 1960, has also considered intervention – it has a small contingent of troops in the country ostensibly to combat jihadi insurgency in the Sahel region – which the junta has given them notice to withdraw. Algeria has also denied France permission to fly over the country.

For now, the situation remains fluid and uncertain. But beneath the surface of daily news headlines is an intricate web of geopolitical competition and strategic agendas that have profound consequences for the Nigerien people.

The recent coup underscores a geopolitical rivalry deeply rooted in colonial and neo-colonial legacies and intensified by some western nations’ drive for the control of the country’s resources.

Although Niger grapples with extreme poverty, leading to widespread malnutrition and hunger among its citizens, it is the world’s seventh-biggest producer of uranium. This juxtaposition of mineral wealth and societal poverty underscores the irony of a nation abundant in resources yet plagued by profound economic hardships.

First discovered in 1957 at Azelik by a French colonial expedition looking for copper deposits, Uranium now ranks as Niger’s second-largest export in monetary value – surpassed only by gold. The country is a principal supplier of uranium to the European Union (EU) and contributes between 15% and 17% of the uranium fuelling France’s electricity generation.

Meanwhile, the country struggles to produce its own electricity because Nigeria recently terminated its power supply to the nation as a sanction against the military junta, leaving much of the country in darkness.

Western exploitation of Niger

Given its abundant natural resources, it seems counterintuitive for Niger to rank among the world’s poorest nations. Yet its economic and political struggles have deep roots in historical foreign interventions, exploitation and resource extraction. This situation has, for decades, been further compounded by misguided and ineffective leadership, often conniving in exploitation by foreign interests.

While some Ecowas members oppose the coup and have threatened military intervention against the coup leaders, some western countries are manoeuvring to uphold their interests. The Nigerian senate opposes military intervention, with one of its members alleging that Ecowas would merely be doing France and America’s bidding. Senator Orji Uzor Kalu suggested that if there is to be military action, it should be carried out by French and US troops.

Colonial powers and other major geopolitical actors have profoundly influenced Niger’s contemporary situation. France, referred to by the New York Times recently as the “Former Coloniser that Stayed”, has already warned that any attack on its interests in Niger will be met with retaliation. Meanwhile the reported presence of Wagner Group mercenaries in the country, after a request from the coup leaders, is a proxy for Russian interests in Niger.

But following the reported death of Wagner Group boss, Yevgeny Progozhin, after his private jet is understood to have crashed on a trip from St Petersburg to Moscow on August 23, the status of the Wagner Group activities in Niger – and Africa generally – is uncertain. However, their operations may come under the direct control of Russia’s military.

African resources, western interests

Another important resource issue threatened by instability in Niger is the trans-Saharan gas pipeline (TSGP), designed to transport natural gas from Nigeria through Niger and on to Algeria and then to Europe. One of the drivers of this project in the past two years has been the European need to wean itself off Russian gas supplies in light of the war in Ukraine.

Yet again, western resource needs are dictating events in supposedly independent and sovereign African countries.

The dominant narrative in west Africa frequently presents foreign interventions as benevolent efforts to stabilise the Sahel region, in particular, against the threat of jihadi insurgency. Yet a deeper examination uncovers a more intricate reality. As western powers strive to shape political dynamics in Niger – driven not just by a desire for stability but also to preserve their dominance and control over resource allocation – they portray Niger, and by extension, Africa, as mere markets within the global economy. This ignores the potential humanitarian consequences of such interventions for the people of Niger and west Africa in general.

As Niger faces political instability and possible violent conflict, there’s a pressing need to critically evaluate the motives and repercussions of foreign intervention.

Beyond the veneer of the quest for democracy and stability, the various players’ deeper strategic intentions must be scrutinised. This is the key to understanding the multifaceted dynamics in the Sahel region and their broader global implications.

Francis Okpaleke, PhD Candidate, Politics and International Security, University of Waikato and Olumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of London

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

August 27, 2023
Niger is a key player in the Sahel region – 4 security implications of the coup
The Niger coup – the fifth in the Sahel and sixth in the broader west Africa region in three years – has pushed the region further into political unrest and insecurity.

Several interests converge there at the intersection of international, regional and local security dynamics.

The Sahel stretches from the Atlantic Ocean eastward to Sudan and Eritrea. It cuts through Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, north-eastern Nigeria and Chad.

The complexity of the Sahel means that the coup has major implications for security in the entire region. Based on years of research and analysis, I see four main potential effects of the Niger coup on the Sahel region and west Africa.

These are:
- a threat to cross-border development projects
- a weakening of the regional body, Ecowas
- a shift in power relations and more global confrontations
- derailing cooperative efforts across the Sahel.
None of these would be good outcomes. They would worsen existing humanitarian crises, including food insecurity, environmental disasters, transnational crime, population displacements and widespread poverty.

Cross-border development projects

The Sahel region is home to several critical transnational development projects, many of which involve Niger. Instability poses a threat to their completion.

An example is US$25 billion Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline, one of the most ambitious projects in west Africa. It aims to connect gas producers in Nigeria to various west African countries, ultimately reaching Morocco and Europe.

Another example is the Trans-Saharan Road. This is a major trade route to boost economic activities across six African countries, including Niger.

Nigeria’s leadership of the Ecowas intervention agenda in Niger can also threaten joint initiatives and bilateral agreements. For instance, there is an arrangement for Nigeria to export power to other countries, including Niger. In exchange, these countries won’t dam the waters that feed major power plants in Nigeria.

Niger is a crucial partner and transit country for the cross-border projects and inter-country agreements. The collapse of trust between countries will severely compromise the future of these projects and agreements. The crisis can delay or derail efforts to enhance regional connectivity and trade.

Regional rifts and a divided Ecowas

Growing mistrust among west African countries would weaken the regional bloc Ecowas, while the possibility of future coups remains. Ecowas has insisted on forcing the junta in Niger to reinstate the ousted President Mohamed Bazoum, including threatening military intervention.

The immediate support offered to the Niger coup leaders by their counterparts in Burkina Faso and Mali points to serious fissures within the bloc.

With these countries’ shared opposition to France and its western allies and a growing preference for Russian partnership, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are merging into a de facto anti-west francophone faction within Ecowas.

This new alignment could reshape the political dynamics of west Africa, creating rifts within a region that has historically aimed for unity. The strong warning issued by the military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso to Ecowas not to interfere in Niger is a notable escalation.

Such posturing hints at a willingness to openly confront the regional body, possibly impairing its diplomatic mechanisms. If Ecowas, which has a history of military intervention to enforce democratic norms, decides to act against the interests of this emerging bloc, the military showdown that becomes conceivable would severely compromise regional unity.

A weakened and divided Ecowas could undo regional economic agendas like the West African Economic and Monetary Union. The coup and regional confrontation would hinder collaboration and threaten ongoing and future joint initiatives.

Niger coup shifting alliances

The dominance of foreign and international actors is one reason for the proliferation of security interests in the Sahel. The coup is threatening to shift alliances. This could trigger security priorities and responsibilities being outsourced even more than they are now.

Several western countries – the US, France and their EU partners – have scaled back their support for Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso in response to coups. This leaves a gap in the region’s security architecture.

In the vacuum, Sahel governments have sought alternative partners. Russia, through the Wagner Group, has emerged as a player.

The Wagner Group raises concerns due to its history of alleged human rights abuses and mercenary behaviour in other conflict zones. Its increasing influence in the Sahel could have severe implications for human security.

For western actors, Niger assumes great importance for two reasons. The first is that it’s seen as a bulwark against jihadism and a bastion of democracy. This explains the presence of western troops and facilities in the country. The second is that it is the world’s seventh-largest producer of uranium and the second-largest supplier of uranium to France.

Therefore it is a country that western countries cannot afford to lose because of who will win: Russia. The Sahel will be a turf for more global superpower confrontations.

Chaos and counter-coups

Niger shares its borders with seven nations and is a critical player in regional security initiatives. The coup could hurt cooperative efforts across the Sahel to respond to extremist groups and terrorism.

Each coup creates a new vacuum and adds new layers to the environment of distrust. The addition of Russia would add complexity and another actor into a “security traffic jam” – where the presence of several actors but with little coordination has created a congested and chaotic security landscape.

The danger is that security forces are spread thinner, allowing extremist groups to expand their territories and influence. Niger has experienced its first post-coup jihadist attack – the first in one and a half years.

The coup culture in francophone countries also risks causing further instability. Military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger do not have the support of all their militaries. This creates an environment for additional coups and counter-coups.

Muhammad Dan Suleiman, Research associate, Curtin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
August 26, 2023
Civilian support for military coups is rising in parts of Africa: why the reasons matter
On the night of 13 January 1963, Togo’s President Sylvanus Olympio was shot dead by rebels in the first military coup staged in Africa. A long list, as shown below, was to come. From the 1960s to the end of the millennium, there were an average of four military coups a year on the continent. By the end of the 1990s this phenomenon seemed to have faded away.

But since August 2020 six African nations have suffered seven coups or attempted coups.

First came Mali, in August 2020. The military took advantage of social unrest and insecurity caused by the activities of violent extremists. Mali had two coups or attempts in a nine-month span.

In April 2021, Chad followed the same path. In March 2021, there was a coup attempt in Niger, and in September 2021 it was Guinea’s turn. A month later, it was Sudan. In Burkina Faso, an attack in November 2021 led to the coup in January 2022.

More recently, a coup was launched in Niger, deposing President Mohamed Bazoum. Two days later, General Abdourahamane Tchiani declared himself the leader of Niger.

All together, that’s more than 100 million people being ruled by the military after power was seized violently. All are in the Sahel. This has alerted governments in the region.

Researchers, analysts and journalists have pointed to mismanagement, incompetence, corruption, economic crisis and state weakness as the main factors propelling military coups all over the world and, of course, in Africa. State weakness is a factor in the recent instances in Africa. They have happened partly because of governments’ failure to stem the spread of groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State all over the Sahel.

But there are two intertwined characteristics that differentiate Africa from the rest of the world. One is the public support of many citizens on the streets when there is a coup. The other is the society’s rising support for military rule as a form of government. Popular support for military rule has grown in the last 20 years.

My research explored the reasons for this. I used survey data to examine whether support for nondemocratic rule was mainly due to poor institutional and economic performance or to an existing so-called authoritarian personality and culture in the region. This type of personality refers to values existing in certain societies that make them more prone to embrace authoritarian forms of government.

This distinction is relevant because if the reason for military rule support is cultural, then societies will continue to endorse authoritarian regimes. If the reason is institutional performance, then as long as incumbent governments perform efficiently, both politically and economically, democratic support will overcome authoritarian support.

Citizen discontent

I carried out a quantitative analysis using Afrobarometer survey data gathered from 37 African countries, both from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis looked for underlying factors propelling the rise in support for military rule.

Respondents were asked about the extent of their support for military rule as a form of government plus a number of other potential explanatory questions such as perception of corruption, governing and opposition parties performance, economy evaluation and socio-demographic issues like their level of education.

The data shows that from 2000 to the present, the level of support for military rule as a form of government has doubled, from 11.6% of people supporting “much” or “very much” military rule as a form of government to 22.3%. Of the 37 countries analysed, there were 11 where support for military dictatorship was decreasing and 26 where this figure was on the rise. The latest Afrobarometer data shows that support for democracy has fallen in the last year. Out of 38 countries, only four show decreasing support for military rule since 2000, whereas 34 show higher support for higher military rule than in 2000.

Support for military rule was higher in “partly free” and “not free” countries than in “free” countries. (They were categorised according to the Freedom House index.)

But there were some exceptions. In South Africa, which is a constitutional democracy with regular elections, one in three South Africans supported military rule as a form of government. In democratic Namibia the level of support showed that one in four Namibians supported military rule.

Reasons to support military rule

The analysis points to three conclusions:
- In sub-Saharan Africa, the legitimacy of military rule is mainly based on institutional performance and economic management. These are weakened by jihadist organisations rapidly expanding throughout the region. State institutions are not able to tackle their expansion throughout the region.
- In North Africa, institutional performance plays a role but authoritarian personality plays a larger role in the support for military rule.
- Education seems to be an antidote against authoritarianism. Those with higher level of education, according to survey data, show higher level of democratic endorsement.
The study’s findings suggest that people in sub-Saharan Africa are fed up with their governments for many reasons, including security threats, humanitarian disasters and lack of prospects. Waiting for the next elections to take place to change government does not seem to them to be a good option. Opposition parties do not seem to enjoy a better image. For the survey respondents, the solution appears to be to welcome the military to intervene.

If citizens perceive that politicians don’t care about them, this will invite the military to continue overthrowing civil governments, with society publicly legitimising their intervention in politics.

If military, political and economic solutions are not found, military coups in the region will increase and people will continue gathering on the streets to welcome them. Niger’s recent coup may not be the last one.

Carlos García Rivero, Associate Professor, Universitat de València

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
August 26, 2023
Ethiopia’s Amhara crisis: Abiy’s political failures threaten a return to war

The federal government of Ethiopia declared a state of emergency in Amhara region on 4 August 2023. A special session of parliament endorsed this decision, placing the administration of the country’s second largest region under the military. This followed clashes between federal troops and Amhara forces resisting a government order to disarm and demobilise regional special forces.

Amhara region is the second most populous region in Ethiopia. Its northern neighbour is the Tigray region, which was the epicentre less than a year ago of the most destructive civil war in the history of modern Ethiopia. Combined with a political climate that is dominated by ethnic narratives, ethnic parties and regional militias, the current crisis has sparked fears of another civil war.

Political tensions with ethnic undertones have been high in Ethiopia. However, forced displacements and massacres targeting ethnic Amharas have continued under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s watch since 2018.

In 2019 Ethiopia was ranked first in the world for the number of internally displaced people. This was more than those displaced by wars in Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan.

With ethnic polarisation higher than ever, pan-Ethiopian unity forces and political parties lost their appeal long ago. Ethnic grievances are now the main organising principles in Ethiopia, which shows why Amharas who were mostly known for supporting national political movements are now organising just as Amharas.

In the last two years alone, ethnic Amharas were displaced from suburbs surrounding Addis Ababa, the capital. Amharas also continue to face harassment by Oromia’s security forces when travelling to Addis Ababa, which is a self administrating city but geographically an enclave of Oromia region.

Then there’s the government’s reliance on ethnic-based militias, such as Amhara Fano fighters whenever it deemed necessary to ensure its survival. During the federal government’s war on Tigray, for example, the overstretched Ethiopia National Defence Force mobilised Amhara youth to fight. Following the war, the Fano emerged well-armed and much stronger with somewhat obscure but seemingly centralised command. This unsettled Abiy and led directly to the present crisis.

For the Fano fighters, however, main causes for their struggle are the continued massacres targeting their group, displacements, and discriminatory treatments that Amharas face across Ethiopia. For example, they mention that the recent mass arrest of Amharas in Addis Ababa by the federal police are examples of Abiy’s continued mistreatment of their group. To make matters worse, families who are demanding to know about the whereabouts of their imprisoned children are facing harassment.

I am a political science scholar with a focus on the Horn of Africa countries. I have also authored a book on ethnic federalism and authoritarian survival in Ethiopia. Nine months into Abiy’s rise to power in Ethiopia, I warned that the persecution of ethnic Amharas could derail his then highly touted political reforms. At the time, he vowed to deal with political violence that targeted any ethnic group and impeded freedom of movement of citizens. Sadly, he failed to deliver.

Today, many in Ethiopia and especially citizens in the Amhara region believe that the incumbent Prosperity Party has lost both the credibility and the administrative capacity to lead the region. It’s my view that Abiy’s use of the military to address such a critical challenge will prove a failure. A military approach could result in more bloodshed.

Ethiopia’s increasing challenges

Once considered the lone hope to resolve Ethiopia’s problems, Abiy eluded scrutiny because of his unifying political rhetoric. But the political challenges continued to intensify. It was not long before political dissent was met with violence by his security forces.

By 2021, the media reported that 5.1 million people had been displaced internally. People from all of Ethiopia’s regional states had experienced forced displacement, mainly due to their ethnic identity. A disproportionate number of these were Amharas targeted in five regions.

The Tigray war was to follow. Two years of fighting, mainly between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, intensified the destruction in the country. Hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians have died and the country needs at least US$20 billion for post conflict reconstruction.

A peace agreement was eventually signed in Pretoria, South Africa, in November 2022. The political settlement brought relief in the country’s north. But Abiy’s regime did not attempt to find political solutions for all the country’s other challenges. For example, once peace in Tigray is achieved, the government did not also attempt to address the grievances of Amharas related to massacres, displacements and harassment they persistently had to endure. Even during the Tigray war, regions such as Afar and Amhara equally suffered from the destruction the war had caused. But the government seems to have ignored their suffering.

As a result, the Amhara region is the centre of conflict with federal forces that has parallels with the Tigray war. The deployment of military drones – an important tool against Tigray – is responsible for the deaths of least 26 civilians in the Amhara city of Finote Selam.

Interestingly, now that the government’s peace deal with Tigray forces is holding, Abiy’s Oromo prosperity party officials are now openly inviting Tigrayans to also arm against the Amhara, which shows that the government is only steadfast to respond to violence by way of more violence.

Amhara region’s case

Amhara’s popular president and top leadership were assassinated months after they came to power in 2019. Since then, the region has not witnessed any semblance of normalcy. Successive Amhara leaders from incumbent Prosperity Party have also become failures.

Into this void stepped Amhara youth groups organised as impromptu militia units tasked with protecting and securing their localities. Over time these morphed into an Amhara popular resistance. A considerable number of disgruntled former Amhara special force members are now part of this fano led resistance after rejecting an offer to integrate with the federal defence force.

This rise in the strength of the Fano forces was cited by Ethiopia’s spy chief to be behind the federal government’s decision to dissolve regional special forces.

The order applies to all regions, but the Amhara view it as a ploy that only targets Amhara’s strong special forces while leaving others intact. They also believe that such a move could expose their region to possible attacks from Oromia and Tigray regions. These regions have claims over Amhara territory that have stoked longstanding tensions.

Amhara also see the move to disarm them as a betrayal, after they made sacrifices during the Tigray war to secure the prime minister’s survival.

What happens next?

Fears of another war that could match or even eclipse what happened in Tigray are not misplaced if a solution is not found. The international community must press all groups, especially Ethiopia’s federal government, to start political dialogue immediately and agree a ceasefire. Federal Authorities in Ethiopia must also learn that only dialogue and direct engagement with the public could help with conflict resolution.

It’s also time for Abiy to prove that Ethiopia can be at peace under his leadership. The impact of another civil war in the Horn of Africa, at the same time as Sudan’s, would be catastrophic.

Yohannes Gedamu, Senior Lecturer of Political Science, Georgia Gwinnett College

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

August 26, 2023