The Lebanese Army announced days ago that it had completed the disarmament of Hezbollah south of the Litani River, declaring that it had achieved “the objectives of the first phase” of the plan to confine weapons exclusively to state authority. This phase covers an area extending 30 kilometres from the border with Israel and has now come under full army control in the southern Litani sector, with the exception of territories and sites still under Israeli occupation.
The Army confirmed that operations in the sector remain ongoing until unexploded ordnance and tunnel networks are fully neutralised, alongside the implementation of measures aimed at consolidating control and preventing armed groups from rebuilding their military capabilities in an irreversible manner.
This announcement coincided with the expiration of the ultimatum issued by U.S. President Donald Trump to the Lebanese government, calling for the dismantling of Hezbollah’s arsenal. Israel had also warned Beirut that failure to act would prompt the Israeli army to undertake the task itself. Yet Trump appears determined to avoid such a scenario, much as he seeks to advance his broader regional vision, including de-escalation in Gaza.
A significant political development followed when Israel appointed Dr Uri Resnik of its National Security Council to lead its delegation to the Military Coordination Committee operating in the area. Lebanon, in turn, named veteran diplomat Simon Karam to head its delegation. The symbolism of this step is notable: it marks the first direct civilian diplomatic engagement between the two sides since the Madrid Conference of the early 1990s.
The decision by Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to allow this meeting reflects an interest—one not shared by Hezbollah—in reducing tensions and potentially laying the groundwork for a future peace process. This approach aligns with Trump’s post-war framework, which prioritises diplomacy in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. Under this framework, Israel may continue to enforce ceasefire understandings and apply selective pressure against Hamas and Hezbollah, primarily through precise and limited airstrikes rather than ground operations. Disarmament, accordingly, is to be pursued through diplomatic pressure and mediated agreements, not deep military incursions.
While Trump seeks regional stability for both strategic and personal reasons, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to pursue what he terms “total victory”: dismantling Hamas and Hezbollah, disarming Gaza and Lebanon, and eliminating heavy weapons and jihadist elements from south-western Syria.
History offers a clear lesson: resistance movements typically aim to harass an occupier rather than liberate territory. From this perspective, Hezbollah’s weapons have existed outside the framework of Lebanese state legitimacy since the group’s founding in the early 1980s. They emerged during one of the state’s weakest moments, amid the chaos of a brutal civil war. Supported by regional actors, these weapons often became tools of internal coercion, with Hezbollah’s military power surpassing that of the Lebanese Army itself. This imbalance placed the Lebanese state, in all its sectarian diversity, under the influence of a single armed actor operating in accordance with external agendas.
It is no secret that Hezbollah’s possession of a “blocking third” in Lebanon’s political system contributed to the country remaining without a president for nearly four years. Former President Michel Aoun’s ascent to office in 2016 was itself the result of a major political settlement endorsed by Hezbollah.
The record is equally clear: Hezbollah’s weapons have drawn Lebanon into more than six wars since the group’s establishment and have brought devastation to Beirut on multiple occasions, having been deployed in service of regional conflicts rather than national priorities.
Much has changed in recent years, particularly after the severe blows dealt to Iran and its nuclear programme during the 12-day war launched by Israel and the United States against Tehran. Hezbollah’s military strength has been sharply eroded following the so-called “pager attack,” the assassination of its former secretary-general, and the collapse of its logistical and financial supply routes after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Left with few options, the party now appears to be clinging to escalation as a final bargaining card.
In this context, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem’s repeated threats appear designed to obscure realities. He claims that the resistance has delivered major achievements for the Lebanese people and describes the government’s decision to disarm Hezbollah as “extremely dangerous,” warning that it would undermine national unity and plunge the country into crisis. While he has called for avoiding street mobilisation and internal conflict, his rhetoric frames coexistence as conditional: either Hezbollah remains armed within the political system, or Lebanon risks collapse.
If the Lebanese state succeeds in disarming Hezbollah across all its territory, it would mark a historic turning point. Hezbollah remains the only faction from the civil war era not only to have retained its weapons after the conflict ended 35 years ago, but to have expanded and modernised them. For decades, even discussing disarmament was politically taboo.
Today, however, Hezbollah faces a markedly different reality. The party is undergoing a phase of financial and organisational retrenchment driven by economic pressures and declining foreign support. Its leadership understands that roughly 80 per cent of its survival depends on its ability to secure funding, pay salaries, and provide services. Any erosion of this capacity poses an existential threat. As a result, Hezbollah has reduced salaries, cut social benefits for fighters, and halted monthly financial support to domestic allies—estimated at around $200,000 per month.
In this light, Qassem’s threats exceed Hezbollah’s actual capabilities. They function less as a prelude to confrontation than as a negotiating tool aimed at preserving the party’s political presence and shielding what remains of its leadership after the collapse of its military dominance.
The disarmament process in Lebanon thus faces a profound dilemma. Efforts to dismantle armed militias collide with fears of instability and the spectre of renewed civil war. These critical moments unfold amid Israeli threats of renewed military action in the south and Beirut’s southern suburbs, alongside intense American pressure pushing Lebanon to proceed with disarmament regardless of internal concerns—even when those concerns are legitimate.
The task is far from complete. Yet the principle of confining weapons exclusively to legitimate state authorities remains a national decision first affirmed in 1989 and reaffirmed in the foundational principles of the current government. Lebanon is a country that has borne extraordinary burdens in the Arab–Israeli conflict and continues to do so, despite its fragile geography and the delicate balance of its social fabric.
Dr. Hatem Sadek – Professor at Helwan University
