Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir has put forward the “Disengagement 710” plan as the political platform and central electoral programme of his party, Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power). The name itself is a symbolic reference to the Hamas attack on Israeli communities on October 7, 2023.
The plan seeks to go beyond conventional military outcomes and advance a sweeping demographic and geographic transformation of the Gaza Strip. It proposes the relocation of approximately 1.86 million Palestinians from Gaza over a seven year period, through a phased process beginning with around 250,000 people in the first year and reaching 1.11 million within three years.
The proposal envisages substantial financial allocations, including an initial investment of $3.1bn and an overall funding framework exceeding $15bn, ostensibly to encourage what Ben Gvir describes as “voluntary migration.” The proposed incentives would include financial payments to Palestinians who leave, as well as funding for states and organizations willing to receive and accommodate them. Ben Gvir has also called for the establishment of a dedicated “Ministry of Voluntary Migration” to oversee international negotiations and implementation. He has declared that adoption of the plan would be a fundamental condition for his party’s participation in any future governing coalition.
Politically, Ben Gvir appears to be attempting to outflank other right wing parties, particularly Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud party, by presenting himself as the only political force willing to advocate what he portrays as “radical solutions” for Gaza rather than relying exclusively on military measures.
The plan also seeks to consolidate support among radical right wing voters and settlers who advocate the re establishment of Israeli settlements in Gaza and the reversal of the consequences of the 2005 disengagement plan.
More than that, the proposal has been designed as a non negotiable bargaining instrument intended to raise the political stakes for Ben Gvir’s party in any future coalition negotiations. In this sense, it could place pressure on potential coalition partners to adopt, at least partially, the plan’s demographic rhetoric and objectives.
In reality, however, the “710” plan remains largely an electoral manoeuvre aimed at domestic consumption. It illustrates how demographic engineering projects can be framed as politically vital programmes in order to mobilize voters and capture support within Israel’s increasingly radicalized right wing constituency.
The prospects of implementing the plan in full, according to its stated timetable, appear extremely limited. This does not, however, mean that some of its mechanisms could not be gradually employed to intensify pressure on Gaza’s population and encourage segments of it to leave.
The plan faces a series of political, legal, and geopolitical obstacles. The first is unequivocal regional opposition. Egypt and Jordan constitute the first line of resistance to any attempt to impose mass displacement on Palestinians. Cairo regards the forced displacement of Palestinians as a direct threat to its national security and has repeatedly treated any attempt to push Palestinians across its borders as a red line, with potentially serious implications for the existing regional security framework and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. This position is broadly supported across the Arab and wider Muslim world.
Moreover, there is currently no state willing to receive hundreds of thousands of forcibly displaced Palestinians — or those described as participating in “voluntary migration” — given the enormous political, security, and economic costs involved, in addition to the reluctance of states to become complicit in what could be perceived as an attempt to permanently alter the demographic and territorial foundations of the Palestinian question.
The US position remains another decisive factor in determining the plan’s feasibility. Any large scale operation aimed at relocating Gaza’s population to other countries would require extensive political cover, international coordination, and diplomatic arrangements that would be difficult to secure without substantial US support for Israel.
There are also significant obstacles under international law. Forced population transfer and deportation are prohibited under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which prohibits the forcible transfer or deportation of protected civilians from occupied territory.
Mass displacement and the forcible alteration of a population’s demographic composition may also constitute war crimes and, depending on the circumstances and the elements of the offenses involved, crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, particularly under Articles 7 and 8. Those responsible could therefore potentially face legal scrutiny and prosecution before competent international judicial bodies.
International law does not necessarily recognize the notion of “voluntary” migration when individuals are making such choices under conditions of comprehensive siege, widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure, or the deliberate creation of an environment in which life becomes effectively unsustainable. Under such circumstances, the purportedly voluntary nature of departure may be seriously undermined by the coercive conditions surrounding it.
There are also internal and practical obstacles. The determination of Gaza’s population to remain on their land and resist displacement constitutes the most immediate challenge to the plan.
Financial and logistical constraints represent another major obstacle. The allocation of billions of dollars to such a project, amid continuing economic pressures and the enormous costs of Israel’s war effort, could face strong resistance from Israeli financial and security institutions, particularly if they regard the proposal as an electoral slogan rather than a viable policy programme.
All of this suggests that Ben Gvir’s plan is primarily a vehicle for electoral mobilization and competition within Israel’s right wing camp, while regional geopolitics, international opposition, and legal constraints make its transformation into an operational reality exceedingly difficult.
Yet a complete assessment requires examining the electoral prospects of Ben Gvir’s Jewish Power party in the elections scheduled for October, particularly in light of the complex and shifting balance within Israel’s party system.
Ben Gvir’s prospects and his potential role in the formation of another far right government can be assessed through several key factors, including the party’s expected electoral strength. Recent polling has suggested that Jewish Power could secure approximately seven to eight Knesset seats, although these projections remain vulnerable to change as alliances and voter preferences within the right wing camp continue to evolve.
Ben Gvir is attempting to outbid the traditional right by using the plan to draw support away from competing parties and establish himself as the most outspoken political representative of Israel’s hard line nationalist camp.
However, his prospects of contributing to the formation of a new far right government face a major obstacle: the declining combined strength of the Netanyahu led right wing and ultra Orthodox bloc. Current polling indicates that Netanyahu’s camp and its right wing and Haredi allies cannot, in their present configuration, reliably secure the 61 seats required for a parliamentary majority.
The relative strength of opposition parties and centrist or centre right forces — including parties associated with figures such as Naftali Bennett and Gadi Eisenkot — further reduces the likelihood of forming a coalition composed exclusively of religious and far right parties.
Ben Gvir may well have a strong opportunity to consolidate his position in the Knesset and preserve, or even expand, his parliamentary base. Translating that electoral strength into an actual far right government, however, will depend on whether the broader right wing camp can overcome its current parliamentary arithmetic. At present, doing so appears difficult without significant political shifts.
Ultimately, the “710” plan may fail to achieve its stated objective of removing 1.86 million Palestinians from Gaza according to the proposed timetable. Yet it could still succeed in achieving a more politically realistic objective: transforming displacement into a tool of political and demographic pressure and, above all, into an electoral instrument capable of strengthening Ben Gvir’s position within Israel’s increasingly competitive right wing camp.
Prof. Hatem Sadek, Helwan University
